

US AIR FORCE WARFARE CENTER

# Air Advisor

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## Handbook

Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence

27 April 2009



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## FOREWORD

A message from Maj Gen Stephen Hoog, USAFWC/CC

The USAF has a long and proud history of air advising. While most of the air advisory effort has traditionally focused on Partner Nation (PN) air forces, all aspects of airpower now receive greater attention. The current effort to rebuild the Iraqi Air Force and the Afghanistan National Army Air Corps highlights the role the General Purpose Force (GPF) plays in this vital endeavor over those traditionally filled by AFSOC. The Air Advisor Handbook (AA HB) is the USAF Warfare Center's, Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence's (CIWC) contribution to simplify execution of the AA mission, drawing on the combined experience of AFSOC and the GPF in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines.

Having commanded the AA effort in Iraq, the challenges faced by the USAF air advisor are all too familiar. At that time there was precious little guidance on how to plan and execute the AA mission. Consequently, I directed the CIWC to produce this HB. Today, under the leadership of Gen Schwartz, the USAF is set to embrace a number of irregular warfare initiatives as part of the standing mission set for the USAF GPF. Future USAF employment will see more AA-type activities that vary in scope from a deployed Airman to whole organizations similar to the 321 and 438 AEWs. Just as AETC and the USAF Expeditionary Center are developing and executing formal AA training, this AA HB will complement this training and greatly assist in planning and execution.

While commanding the Iraqi Air Force AA mission was possibly my most frustrating tour, it was also my most rewarding. The opportunity to contribute professionally to the re-birth of a PN air force that was once a formidable force with a long and proud history was one of the highlights of my career. The professional satisfaction in knowing you are directly contributing to the rebuilding of a PN's air capability will resonate with all those selected to serve as an AA. The dedication displayed by all AAs involved with current AA missions, from the Philippines to Afghanistan, highlights the basic tenet that USAF Airmen believe in the value of airpower.

Whatever your AFSC, the heart of being an effective AA is your role and dedication as an instructor. It is through your ability to communicate professional knowledge and skills to a PN Airman, both practical and in theory, that you will derive the same professional satisfaction as when teaching new USAF Airmen vital airpower skills.

I endorse this Air Advisor Handbook as a vital tool in preparing you for your AA assignment, whether you are deploying as an individual, as a team member, or as the commander of a larger effort. This AA HB will provide you with a number of considerations, guidance, and resources to assist you in your pre-deployment preparation and mission execution.

Good Luck!



STEPHEN L. HOOG  
Maj Gen, USAF  
Commander, USAFWC

## **PARTICIPANTS**

The Air Advisor Handbook was coordinated with the following key USAF agencies:

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HQ AFSOC/A8

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USAF EC

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

**1.1. Purpose.** This handbook provides information and guidance for Air Advisors (AAs). The target audience for this publication is AAs involved in current advisory efforts, as well as those called upon to do this mission in the future. AAs assist the partner nation's (PN) air force<sup>1</sup> to build, sustain and implement air power capacities in support of national policies. Specifically, AAs assist PN's air force to develop infrastructure; organization; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and training programs to promote interoperability with US and Coalition air forces.

**1.1.1. Mission.** Every AA mission is initiated by one of several agencies within the US Government (e.g., Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DoD), geographical combatant command (GCC)), which for the purposes of this document shall be referred to as the tasking authority. The tasking authority will provide the AA mission statement, intent, objectives, and end state, as applicable. These will guide the development of the AA plan of execution to achieve the desired end state.

**1.1.2. Preparation.** Success as an AA requires thorough preparation and the ability to evaluate the assigned PN, conduct detailed planning, and execute the mission. AA preparation consists of attending formal training and conducting self-study of the PN by reviewing previous country studies, conducting independent research or a combination of both. The AA's evaluation must consider threats to the PN's national security and examine the relevant instruments of the PN's national power. Such evaluation will help the AA prioritize mission objectives. These objectives are provided the AA or will have to develop them in conjunction with the Combatant Command (COCOM) staff and US Embassy Country Team. The AA will then conduct detailed mission planning to develop an execution plan to meet the objectives.

**1.2. Change Procedures.** Active input to this document will help the USAF in improving AA capabilities. The Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence (CIWC) is the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for this document and will review and make necessary changes every 12 months or as required. Forward suggested changes to the CIWC at [USAFWCCIWC.IWAV@nellis.af.mil](mailto:USAFWCCIWC.IWAV@nellis.af.mil).

**1.3. Foreign Disclosure Office.** USAF training program material, technical and regulatory publications cannot be released without prior approval. Approval must be coordinated through the USAF foreign disclosure office, [SAF/IAPD](#).

**1.4. References.** The CIWC maintains a community of practice (CoP) website with links to materials referenced in this handbook. The web address for the CoP is: <https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/ASPs/CoP/OpenCoP.asp?Filter=AC-OP-00-67>. Additionally, hyperlinks to specific subjects are included at Appendix A Glossary of References.

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this handbook, the use of "partner nation" or "PN" air force will be used to describe a PN's air capabilities regardless of whether they are organized as an independent force or integrated with another branch of service (e.g., Army Air Corps) or government agency (e.g., police force).

## CHAPTER 2

### AIR ADVISOR CONSIDERATIONS

**2.1. Purpose.** This chapter prepares the AA by discussing preparation requirements, the characteristics of a good advisor, and other key considerations.

#### **2.2. Air Advisor Preparation Requirements.**

**2.2.1. Formal Training.** The mandatory 21-day AA training course is administered by Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and executed by the USAF Expeditionary Center at Ft Dix, NJ. USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS) offers additional formal training upon request.

**2.2.2. Self-Study.** While not a substitute for the formal course, the [CIWC CoP](#) has links to computer based training, briefings, and recommended readings. To augment the formal training course, there are numerous sites available for self study to include: Department of State (DOS); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) country studies; and the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) country studies.

**2.2.2.1. Partner Nation Culture.** Knowledge of the PN culture should be as deep and nuanced as possible; the AA must understand what is meaningful to the PN in their context. An AA should have an understanding of cultural and social customs, and etiquette. Ignorance of local customs will harm the AA's effectiveness and potentially damage the reputation of the AA team or the USAF. The USAFSOS Cross-Cultural Communications (CCC) Course assists understanding in this key area.

**2.2.2.2. History.** An AA will serve as a reference guide for their PN counterpart for all questions regarding the US military and US history. A basic understanding of the PN's history will greatly assist the AA's understanding of the PN psyche and approach to air power.

**2.2.3. Additional Skills.** In addition, detailed below are some of the skills and knowledge critical to becoming an AA.

**2.2.3.1. Negotiation Skills.** The aggregate effect of successful or failed negotiations has a tremendous impact on the ability of the US military to accomplish its mission abroad, as well as to meet US and PN strategic goals.

**2.2.3.2. Interpersonal Skills.** The AA must develop personal relationships with those he is tasked to advise. The advisor must display genuine concern both for their PN counterparts and for the future of the PN. Several interpersonal skills such as patience, open mindedness, humility, and respect enhance the AA's overall effectiveness.

**2.2.3.3. Partner Nation Language.** AAs who speak the PN's language are more effective than those who do not. As a minimum, AAs should learn key phrases and strive for functional fluency. This demonstrates that the AA is making an attempt to integrate and this will help the AA earn the respect of the PN and increase the chance of the PN making a reciprocal effort. More often, this level of language proficiency is more beneficial than attempting to be fluent where key regional phrases or slang prohibits full comprehension. Language training resources are available online through the Defense Language Institute.

**2.2.3.4. Translation of Documents to English.** In order to effectively assess the PN air force and provide them training and assistance, some key documents may need to be translated into English. It is best to identify and translate such documents as early as

possible. Examples include the PNs national military strategy, key directives, standing orders, operating instructions, training materials, and technical manuals.

**2.2.3.5. Interpreters.** The challenge of properly vetting and hiring local interpreters highlights the need for assigning advisors with the requisite language skills. Even with recent USAF efforts to increase its inventory, there are still not enough linguists. To make matters worse, the demand for properly vetted local interpreters continues to outpace supply. Thus, advisors must allow time in their plan to screen and hire local interpreters. Planners must also build in specialized training for local interpreters on military and technical vocabulary and provide them with an overview of the AA mission. It is highly recommended that AAs allow their PN counterpart to interview and select individuals to be interpreters. This enables the PN to participate and take ownership of the hiring process. It also provides an opportunity for PN leadership to express concerns about individuals before they are hired.

## CHAPTER 3

### PARTNER NATION FAMILIARIZATION

**3.1. Purpose.** Formal and self-initiated study of a PN builds an AA's specific knowledge and is critical for effective mission planning and successful mission execution. PN study should focus on four general areas: analyzing the PN's instruments of national power; estimating threats to the PN; identifying and prioritizing AA mission objectives; and evaluating the capacity of the PN's air force to achieve their national security and military objectives. DOS has country studies that are a good starting point. Additionally, the AA should review the PN air forces' current capabilities and capacity.

**3.2. Instruments of National Power.** The instruments of national power are Diplomatic/Political, Information, Military, and Economic, commonly referred to as DIME. A good place to start studying a PN is analyzing it in terms of DIME. The topics below are merely a starting point and meant to generate AA team discussion and analysis.

**3.2.1. Diplomatic/Political.** Diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of groups or states. Politics is the process by which groups of people make decisions. These two concepts dictate how the PN government relates to other states and how it wields power internally.

**3.2.1.1. Regional Balance of Power.** Where a country is positioned in a region or sub-region influences its behavior. Does the PN act as a buffer between other states in the area? Does a neighboring state actively support insurgent activity or do they provide a safe haven as a result of their weakness?

**3.2.1.2. Power Brokers.** It is also important to analyze the individual actors who exert power (e.g., military, religious, corporate, tribal, regional, etc.). Awareness of a specific leader's background, education, and experience provide insight into his motivation and decision making process.

**3.2.1.3. Ethnic Groups.** An AA should be cognizant of ethnic and tribal relationships. In many cases, these ties may be stronger than national affiliations. In areas of the country where the government has little credibility, the population's loyalty may lie with tribal elders or religious leaders instead of government institutions.

**3.2.1.4. Government.** The structure and traditions of the PN government influence decision making and resource allocation. Which individuals and organizations within the government have the most influence and control the purse strings? Are non-ethical practices part of the accepted political system? How do the people perceive their government? How do the people perceive the US Government (USG)?

**3.2.1.5. Memberships.** What is the PN level of participation in the United Nations? Do they belong to a regional alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)?

**3.2.1.6. Stability.** How stable is the government? Are minority groups represented proportionally? How widespread is support amongst the people? Was the government democratically elected?

**3.2.2. Information.** Information is power. The extent to which the government controls information content and dissemination is often an indicator of the government's self confidence.

**3.2.2.1. Media.** A free, open press is an essential element of a democratic society. How accessible are printed material, television, radio, and the Internet to the common citizen? Is the press corps professional? How much information is censored?

**3.2.2.2. Literacy.** The average education level of PN air force personnel will be a significant factor in formulating a training plan. How many years of education are compulsory? Where are the centers of learning? How many attend university or technical training outside the PN?

**3.2.2.3. Internet.** The number of people with regular access to the Internet may be an indicator of information exchange. Does the PN filter Internet content? How many people have access to computers? Do PN insurgents use the Internet?

**3.2.3. Military.** The purpose of any national military is to protect territory and resources from aggressors and, when necessary, fight and win the nation's wars. The military is often a direct reflection of PN values, principles, and standards.

**3.2.3.1. Leadership.** Understanding a military leader's education, life experience, and personal beliefs will help an AA determine how best to approach the individual with recommendations and solutions. Are the military leaders career soldiers or do they ascend to power based on blood ties?

**3.2.3.2. Organizational Structure.** An understanding of how the PN's military is organized helps focus the AA team's attention on key decision makers and organizations. Additionally, countries may not have a separate air force; it may be organized under the army or other government organization. Does the organizational structure facilitate decision making? Is there enough manpower to support the organization?

**3.2.3.3. Military Infrastructure.** An assessment of the PN's military infrastructure is essential to determine where improvements may be made quickly and to develop effective mission objectives.

**3.2.4. Economic.** A strong economy with free access to global markets and resources for economic expansion is the engine that drives the general welfare, enables a strong national defense, and determines a country's place on the global and regional stages. The state of a country's economy has a direct impact to the level of foreign investment and the prosperity of its citizens.

**3.2.4.1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP).** The GDP and gross domestic income (GDI) are measures of national income and output for a given country's economy. These are universally accepted indicators of a country's economic health.

**3.2.4.2. National Debt.** How much debt has the PN accumulated? To whom is the PN indebted?

**3.2.4.3. Foreign Aid.** What foreign aid does the PN receive and from whom? How much foreign aid does the US provide the PN?

**3.2.4.4. Military Spending.** The percentage of GDP that the PN spends on their national defense is a good indicator of the priority the government places on its military. PN funding of the military will have a profound influence on mission objectives. The PN may not have the economic capacity to make drastic changes or purchase equipment.

**3.3. Threats.** Threat analysis is key to identifying opportunities for developing air force capabilities to counter current and/or future threats.

**3.3.1. Internal Threats.** An internal threat undermines the PN's ability to freely exercise its instruments of national power and achieve its national security objectives. In most cases, the request for a US AA mission is in response to a security threat that compels the PN's air force to improve its capabilities and/or capacity. For example, the PN could be experiencing an insurgency. An effective air force could reinforce the PN's ability to govern, secure the populace, and reduce the insurgents' asymmetric advantages.

**3.3.2. External Threats.** The objective of an external threat is to limit the PN's ability to control its instruments of national power and create conditions that support their cause. Traditional state-on-state conflicts are generally caused by disputes over borders and natural resources such as oil or water. In an irregular warfare environment, the external threat may be a neighboring state whose forces are not active participants in the fight, but provide sanctuary or material support to an insurgency group working against the PN.

**3.3.3. Other Threats.** A PN may be threatened by natural disasters like hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes or tsunamis. Other threats may include famine, an epidemic or a significant influx of refugees from a neighboring country. One of the PN's objectives may be to improve its air force to effectively perform humanitarian and disaster relief missions.

**3.4. Sources of Information.** Other DoD sources of information might include the geographic combatant commander (GCC), previously deployed units (including NATO and allied units), Lessons Learned databases, and country teams. The US Embassy Military Group, which includes the Office of Military Cooperation, Office of Defense Cooperation, and the Joint United States Military Advisory Group can provide a great deal of current information. Additionally, US Embassy staff officers and the Defense Air Attaché are a wealth of knowledge and many have years of experience in the region or country. Intelligence community reports and threat assessments are also a good source of information. US Embassy Mission Performance Plan, as well as the GCC Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) are other valuable sources for the AA.

**3.5. Prioritized Mission Objectives.** The result of the PN familiarization should be a prioritized set of realistic and achievable strategic, operational, and tactical mission objectives. These objectives will guide the assistance provided to the PN to develop its air force capabilities. The objectives at all levels must always bolster the PN's ability to conduct independent operations and operate effectively with US and coalition air forces in support of its national security objectives.

### **3.6. Understanding the PN Airmen.**

**3.6.1. Background.** Everything the USAF does revolves around some sort of written guidance, whether it is technical data, instructions, directives or policies. As an example, US maintenance policies and procedures are driven by AFI 21-101. The maintenance mission is focused on aircraft and equipment readiness. The maintenance function ensures aircraft and equipment are safe, serviceable and properly configured to meet the mission. The US military has grown accustomed to purchasing a fully funded platform, technically and logistically supported from cradle-to-grave. In the case of a PN air force, it is more than likely that their AC inventory consists of numerous airframe types, potentially numbering no more than one or

two of each type, and depending on how they were acquired, will most likely not have any form of support assistance (from spare parts, AGE, and publications).

**3.6.2. The Vignette.** The USAF is establishing an AA presence in a PN nation and in relation to maintenance policy the PN has no equivalent to AFI 21-101. There is no formalized maintenance program and many of their aircraft have been donated from various sources and pieced together. The AA must be prepared to assist the PN establish their own version of our AFI 21-101, while making an assessment as to what constitutes airworthiness such that the PN can employ its aircraft safely.

Safety must be in the forefront of any operation performed on the flight line, and the maintenance AA must decide if there is a minimum accepted level of risk, which must be agreed with the PN air force to meet mission requirements while developing a culture of accountability.

Once the aircraft are deemed airworthy, the AA then must address additional procedural questions: Who is the authority to sign off major maintenance and is this authority the responsibility of the AA or the PN maintainer? Is there an inspected-by process to validate performed maintenance or should a system be developed that fits with the PN culture? Is there a preventive maintenance program, and is it linked to their airworthiness goals? Does the PN have a long term fleet management concept?

**3.6.3. So What?** All AAs must be cognizant of challenges that could be faced as an AA and the fact that what may seem normal USAF practice is not necessarily evident or accepted in other parts of the world.

AAs will face many challenges, mostly associated with developing the skills and competency of the PN air force. Remember, PN Airmen's job skill levels will most likely be equivalent to that of a basic recruit. The AA must play an important role in developing basic skills training programs as well as upgrade training and development of the PN Airmen.

Another aspect when working with a PN air force is how mature their NCO structure is and how it is employed to deliver airpower effects—once again the AA will be relied upon to lay the foundation for this program. Keep in mind that while expanding or developing these programs, the focus must remain on the mission at hand.

Additional challenges will revolve around language barriers. Everything the USAF does revolves around some sort of written guidance, whether it is technical data, instructions, directives or policies. In some cases the English language is not spoken nor understood by all the PN Airmen, so training initially will be a challenge until provisions are made otherwise. Interpreters are not always available, so other means of communicating must be established; hence the importance of understanding the PN culture.

The AA mission is by no means mission impossible; it will just requires a little thinking outside the box.

## CHAPTER 4

### AIR ADVISOR PLANNING

**4.1. Purpose.** This chapter provides some considerations to plan an AA mission. Considerations discussed in this chapter are not an exhaustive list, but a starting point for mission planners. Understanding the AA mission objectives is critical in developing a plan. The objectives will drive the size and composition of the AA team. The Doctrine; Organization; Training; Materiel; Leadership and Education; Personnel; and Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct is also a helpful guide.

**4.2. Setting the Stage.** AAs are required to help a PN establish a safe and secure environment, and activities to further assist a PN establish security forces and governing mechanisms to transition to self-rule, thus eliminating the need for armed conflict. Understanding the six phases of military operations should help shape AA efforts and provide a better understanding of how the AA effort fits into the Joint Force Commander’s campaign plan, see Fig 4.1.




Figure 4.1 Phases of Military Operations

**4.2.1. Rebuilding the PN Military.** Depending on the circumstances in the PN, the AA must keep in mind that the PN air force may be nonexistent, or very underdeveloped. Understanding the requirements necessary to rebuild an air force are essential. The final design for the new or evolved PN air force structure must consider the cultural and historical aspects of their previous efforts. Culture will provide a view on how the service operates, whether tribal affiliation or social standing is more important than actual rank (a case of not what you know but who you know). Cultural and historical considerations will be further enhanced by an understanding whether the PN air force has a history of being part of a standing army or as an independent air force. Additionally, AA must be well versed in recruiting techniques, monetary needs, clothing requirements, the need for guidance and procedures, and US funding sources. Keep in mind, the current capability of the PN air force will also impact the available PN skill levels, and the experience level in the NCO and SNCO corps.

### **4.3. Planning Elements.**

**4.3.1. Mission Objectives.** These objectives are provided or the AA will have to develop them in conjunction with the COCOM staff and US Embassy Country Team. The AA will conduct mission planning to achieve US and PN objectives.

**4.3.1.1. Tasks.** The mission intent must be clearly understood and the specified and implied tasks and their purposes should be stated to ensure mission execution satisfies all mission objectives.

**4.3.2. Time Line.** The tasking authority may predetermine the time line which dictates in advance when a project is complete. The time line may be affected by circumstances beyond control (e.g., wars, changes in national policy, etc.) that no longer permit US or Coalition Partner involvement in country.

**4.3.3. Metrics.** Performance metrics should be used to determine the level of success. Developing performance metrics usually follows a process of establishing critical processes/customer requirements, developing measures, and establishing targets/goals that the results can be scored against. Metrics for each foundational capability should be developed and periodically evaluated for effectiveness and progress towards the end state.

**4.3.4. End State.** As a general rule, once the PN has achieved autonomy in a particular foundational capability, the advisory function can be reduced to a single liaison officer, guiding the PN as they grow their force to an appropriate level of foundational competence.

**4.4. Air Advisor Team Composition.** AA team composition should not be approached as a one-size-fits-all solution. The team should include personnel with skill sets that specifically address the PN's air force needs and both US and PN mission objectives. Where necessary or advantageous, acknowledge and recruit particular skill sets that may be better provided by coalition partners, capitalizing on cultural, historical, ethnic, technical, and regional similarities.

**4.4.1. US Air Advisor Force Structure.** Designing the AA organization is just as important as that of the PN military structure. Within the AA organization, a clearly stated chain of command is essential; the size of the organization must be appropriate to achieve US mission objectives and PN requirements. Aligning the organizational structure with the PN command structure is another critical consideration. A number of other factors will further influence this decision, including whether this is a single-service or joint effort, the size of the advisory force, the expected duration of the effort, and the way the PN force is organized, and Coalition involvement, for example.

**4.4.2. Level of US Effort.** A number of factors will influence this decision, including whether it is a single-service or joint effort, the size of the advisory force, the expected duration of the effort, the way the PN force is organized, etc. In Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, the aviation advisory effort in both countries initially used a “task force” structure which aligned well with the US Army-led command structure in place. These task forces were eventually designated as Air Expeditionary Wings, aligning them with traditional USAF force structure and allowing them to seamlessly use the Command Selection Board process for Wing, Group and Squadron command position matching.

**4.4.3. Organizational Stability.** Caution should be exercised to ensure the size of the advisory effort is appropriately matched to an organizational structure that maximizes US AA and PN synergies. This area requires careful consideration during the planning phase to ensure a consistent approach from the outset. Careful consideration will avoid changes to the organizational structure mid-effort, maintaining a clear line of engagement with the PN. If a wing structure is used, flexibility should be exercised in the choice of subordinate level command boundaries.

**4.4.3.1. Vignette.** The dynamic nature of aviation advising often demands that training activities occur simultaneously with operational employment and rebuilding activities, and while it may be logical or expedient to separate subordinate levels by functionality, consideration should also be given to the synergies apparent in the “one base, one boss” model of command. Consideration should also be given to modeling the US command structure after the PN structure, whatever that may be. The advantage of this approach lies in the reduction of friction and confusion; as an example; if the PN is using an A-staff model, but their A4 directorate is responsible for Communications, it may be wise for the US equivalent to follow suit knowing that each PN directorate may incorporate multiple functions—A4 directorate may actually incorporate communications and logistics. This modeling approach may be used in conjunction with the wing structure described above, or may be used as the model for the entire US advisory effort, as a possible solution to a small-scale and/or single service advisory force. The current USAF AA AEW organizational chart is provided in Figures 4.2.




Figure 4.2 Sample AEW Organization Chart

**4.4.4. Additional US Air Advisor Manpower Considerations.** There are a number of key positions that should be incorporated into the AA team for mission success; consider the full spectrum of USAF Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs). While not an all-inclusive list, observations from recent USAF AA efforts identified the following AFSCs and professions as critical force enablers:

**4.4.4.1. Political Military (Pol/Mil) Affairs Officer.** The Pol/Mil Officer provides the AA leadership with a single point of contact focused specifically on the PN's government and its interaction with the USAF. His expertise enables the AA leadership to better formulate PN engagement plans.

**4.4.4.2. Acquisitions Officer.** A major part of the AA mission may be the sale of equipment to the PN. Equipment will be purchased through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Acquisition personnel will work closely with the PN and the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA) to identify and manage the transfer of US technology. Acquisition personnel will specifically develop, review, coordinate, and execute acquisition management plans to support daily operations, contingencies, and war fighting capabilities.

**4.4.4.3. Contracting Officer.** The Contracting Officer acquires services and equipment, and is a key member of the AA leadership. He is an additional point of contact that provides continuity in negotiations and understands the myriad of rules and regulations associated with spending US funds. This individual works closely with the Acquisitions Officer, SAF/IA, and the appropriate DOS liaison.

**4.4.4.4. Public Affairs Officer (PAO).** Insurgent forces are adept at using the media to their advantage. Thus, a PAO is a vital part of the AA team. A PAO will formulate a media plan tailored appropriately for the PN information structure and populace, using every type of media available from digital communications to word-of-mouth to support mission objectives and mitigate potential negative press. When more complicated issues arise such as destruction of PN property or the injury or death of PN civilians, the PAO acts as an advisor for both US and PN officials. Themes and messages must be thoroughly coordinated with the PN government and air force. A well coordinated PA campaign can greatly assist the PN government and air force in countering insurgent groups. For example, the Philippine Air Force significantly improved their professionalism with help and advice from the AA. Their improved image and the perception that they could provide better opportunities for young men than insurgent groups could offer, helped their recruiting efforts.

**4.4.4.5. Service Liaison Officers.** Similar to the USAF having its roots in the US Army Air Corps, a number of fledging PN air forces are also organized as an air corps under the PN national army, or other services. The existence of a PN's military air capability as an air corps often indicates a historical perspective or more importantly, a recognition that due to the expense of maintaining a viable air capability, any effort is best organized under an army organization as a supporting arm, similar to artillery etc. For example, a US Army Civil Affairs Officer understands the doctrine of the land force and provides expertise in stability and reconstruction operations. He also provides a unique point of view by virtue of service relationships.

**4.4.4.6. Department of State Liaison Officer.** Coordination and synchronization with the DOS is vital. DOS LO is the main link between the US and PN government, as well as other US agencies.

**4.4.4.7. Air Force Special Operations Command's (AFSOC) 6 Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS) Combat Aviation Advisor (CAA).** The AFSOC 6 SOS is a valuable resource for AAs and should be included in the AA team for the experience they bring to the mission, including potential PN contacts through routine AFSOC PN engagement programs. Often the 6 SOS has history with the PN and can provide information ranging from technical capacity and competency to key human relationships. Due to the 6 SOS's high operations tempo, they may not be able to provide a team member, but at a minimum the AA should establish a dedicated point of contact.

**4.4.4.8. Airpower Strategic Planner.** The Airpower Strategic Planner can help develop, guide, and assess the long-term AA and PN strategy. An important contribution of an AA team is the long-term strategic plan that can act as a generational PN service plan, guiding the PN air force well past individual AA engagements.

**4.4.4.9. Civil Engineer Strategic Planner.** The Civil Engineer Strategic Planner can advise, design, and forecast long-term engineering and infrastructure needs.

**4.4.4.10. Communications Strategic Planner.** The Communications Strategic Planner can advise, design, and forecast long-term information technology needs.

**4.4.4.11. Medical Strategic Planner.** The Medical Strategic Planner can assess, plan, and forecast PN medical requirements to keep PN airmen healthy and allow them to develop an enduring medical system to operate effectively.

**4.4.5. Air Advisor Key Leadership Requirements.** The rank of key leadership should be commensurate with the responsibility inherent in the advisory function, both to the PN and other governmental agencies. For a large scale effort the senior US officer should be of flag rank. Careful consideration should be given to the selection of both the rank of the senior USAF commander and to their experience and qualifications. If a wing, group or squadron structure is used for the US effort, commanders selected should have prior experience commanding.

**4.5. Partner Nation Military Structure.** AA recommendations to the structure of the PN air force must be realistic and sustainable. The AA must take into account the PN's manpower, technical competence, infrastructure, and fiscal resources, as well as, culture and historical background. Technical competence does not reflect intelligence level or the capacity to learn. There are numerous examples where PNs have adopted a structure, either by observation or through direct advice that mirror the USAF. In reality, a USAF structure may be impractical given their capacity.

**4.5.1. Rank Structure.** If the role of the AA is to re-shape the PN air force, the AA should recommend a rank structure appropriate to the PN air force's mission and size and not one based around the USAF. The rank structure of the PN force could be modeled on similarly sized air forces using key Allied AF's as a guide. As an example, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has a personnel strength of approximately 13,500 people. Accordingly, the enlisted rank structure is designed such that there are six non-commissioned ranks: when compared to the USAF organization, each RAAF rank undertakes the duties of two or more USAF ranks based on experience, training and seniority. Topping the RAAF enlisted structure is the Warrant Officer. This position was once employed by the USAF but in the case of smaller air forces, the Royal Air Force included, provides a vastly experienced senior non-commission officer (NCO) that can command detachments, units, and activities as well as lead, coach, train and counsel airmen. As leaders and technical/tactical experts, Warrant

Officers provide valuable skills, guidance and expertise to commanders and organizations in their particular field. Further, Warrant Officers provide mentorship, leadership and training to NCOs to support technical, tactical and mission-related tasks. The relationship between the warrant officer and NCO is similar to the commissioned officer. They rely on each other for help, advice and assistance to accomplish the unit's mission.

**4.5.2. Multi-Role Aircraft.** A small PN air force will try to maximize the capability of their limited aircraft resources, by employing multi-role, multi-mission aircraft. For example, a PN could operate a light transport aircraft in the mobility, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), search and rescue (SAR), airborne command and control (C2), and surveillance role. The AA will provide guidance on PN employment concepts, maintenance and sustainment practices, tasking processes, aircrew resource management, flight safety, and currency considerations.

**4.5.3. Professional Training.** Professional training poses considerable challenges for AAs when looking to advance the technical and professional skills of a PN. Due to constraints posed by the size of the PN's air force, professional military training should not be a drain on human resources or negatively impact the PN's operations.

**4.5.4. Command Model Considerations.** Due to its size and mission scope the PN command model may combine functions that are normally performed by a separate USAF staff element. For example; if the PN is using an A-staff model, their A4 directorate may combine Communications and Logistics.

**4.5.5. Cultural Context.** PN culture influences how the service operates. In some areas tribal affiliation or social standing is more important than actual rank. The AA must be aware of cultural mores that may influence PN military culture.

**4.5.6. Historical Context.** The PN air force may have been part of a standing army, rather than an independent service. Additionally, the historical background of the PN air force may provide an indication of the effort required to adjust their perception on how a modern military air force will operate.

**4.5.7. Strengths.** Identifying points of strength within the PN's existing structure will ease the effort and facilitate the introduction of new concepts. Further, the inclusion of coalition partners that have a strong history of cooperation with the PN air force will also pay dividends.

**4.6. National Infrastructure.** The PN infrastructure will support, limit or delay future capabilities. The AA team must examine the country's infrastructure focusing on their area of expertise and identify potential issues that will prevent the AA team from accomplishing their mission objectives. Improvements to PN infrastructure should be prioritized and coordinated with other major stakeholders to maximize fiscal resources, prevent duplication of effort, and ensure that it is sustainable by the PN.

**4.7. Partner Nation Education & Training.** Professional airmen are the foundation for any air force. A comprehensive education and training program is critical to developing professional airmen. PN air force education and training programs must be realistic and tailored to each PN's operational priorities. The AA must consider the challenges associated training. Some considerations include the advantages, disadvantages, opportunities and availability of selected training venues. The choices available when considering training venues include PN in-country training, continental US (CONUS) based training or outside CONUS (OCONUS) based training.

**4.7.1. Partner Nation In-Country Training.** The advantages of in-country training are lower costs associated with transporting PN personnel, the AA force retains greater control over

training, and the PN students maintain continuity and productivity at their regular jobs. The disadvantages include greater number of distractions and a higher cost to the US.

**4.7.2. Continental United States (CONUS) Based Training.** The major advantage to CONUS based training is the opportunity for immersion in the English language, American culture, and USAF service culture. Long term, less tangible benefits of CONUS based training include the personal relationships PN personnel develop with their American counterparts, the potential leap in advancing the PN air force's processes and capabilities with first-hand exposure, and the betterment of their country's relationship with the US. Some of the disadvantages include a higher cost to the PN and, in extreme cases, the possibility of defection.

**4.7.3. Outside CONUS (OCONUS) Based Training.** There may be opportunities for training in a country other than the PN or the US. Training offered OCONUS would be particularly advantageous when the PN's airframes are not US made (such as the Mi-17) and the other country uses the airframes. ELT could be conducted in another English-speaking country closer to the PN, reducing travel costs for the PN and the training burden on the US. It is important to note that training options OCONUS may be limited by resource and capacity issues. The PN should have a stable and preferably long-term alliance with the third-party country and all political factors must be taken into consideration.

**4.7.4. Other Training Options.** A hybrid approach that provides basic training in-country and more advanced training to a select group in the US may be the best approach. More intensive training in the US or a third-party country may be better suited to address a PN's critical skill shortfalls.

**4.7.5. Partner Nation English Language Training (ELT).** Language differences are an obvious obstacle to training, advising, and mentoring foreign aviation forces and must be considered for every mission. Significant thought and effort needs to be given to anticipate language differences and in building a comprehensive plan to acquire interpreters while conducting ELT. ELT can be sourced through the Defense Language Institute (DLI), US contracted language trainers, or a third-country organization. Failure to anticipate the challenges of executing both programs at the same time will impact the overall success of the AA effort. As an example, most Iraqi officers could understand enough English to exchange ideas. In contrast, none of the enlisted personnel could read or speak English at a sufficient level for the exchange of concepts in a training environment. The resulting language barrier was a significant factor affecting training timelines and mission effectiveness.

**4.7.6. Partner Nation Technical Training.** The AA and PN must develop a comprehensive technical training program to ensure technical proficiency. The PN must be able to maintain and sustain their military training program.

**4.7.7. Partner Nation Professional Military Education (PME).** PME is designed to provide an understanding of military concepts and build leadership and followership skills in both the enlisted and officer corps. PME should be a formal continuing education program that advances an airmen's knowledge of air power principles and professionalism as they progress through their career.

**4.7.7.1. International Military Education and Training (IMET).** The IMET program is a key component of US security assistance that gives grants for students from allied nations for training. IMET exposes students to the US professional military establishment and the American way of life, including US regard for democratic values, respect for individual and human rights, and belief in the rule of law. Students are also exposed to US military

procedures and the manner in which the US military functions under civilian control. Authority for IMET was established in Chapter 5, part II, Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 1961 and funding comes from the DOS International Affairs budget.

#### **4.8 Other Considerations.**

**4.8.1. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).** A SOFA is not a basing or access agreement, but rather it defines the legal status of US personnel and property in the territory of another nation. The purpose of a SOFA is to codify rights and responsibilities between the US and PN government on such matters as criminal and civil jurisdiction, wearing of uniforms, carrying arms, tax and customs relief, how US personnel may enter and exit the country, and resolving damage claims. The SOFA plays a vital role in preserving command authority, guaranteeing fair treatment of individual service members, and conserving scarce resources.

**4.8.1.1. Types.** There are three general types of SOFAs. There are SOFAs that define the status of administrative and technical staff under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges, commonly referred to as A and T status. A mini-SOFA can be implemented for a short-term and specified presence like an exercise. A formal, permanent SOFA is used for long-term presence. The type of SOFA in place depends on the nature and duration of US activity in the PN, the maturity of the US relationship with that country, and the prevailing political situation in the PN.

**4.8.1.2. Considerations.** The first question an AA planner should ask is whether a SOFA between the US and PN exists. Your servicing legal office can answer this question. In the absence of a SOFA, an AA must immediately refer the issue to proper authorities within the USAF, Secretary of Defense, and the DOS. They will coordinate and negotiate with the PN to implement the necessary agreement.

**4.8.2. Rules of Engagement (ROE).** ROE define the circumstances under which US forces may use or be involved in operations where lethal force is authorized and they also address the right of self defense. ROE facilitate mission accomplishment, force protection, and compliance with law and policy. ROE are developed based on operational requirements, US policy, and international, US, and local laws. ROE must be well disseminated throughout the force and regularly reinforced with training.

**4.8.3. Force Protection (FP).** FP is a collection of activities that prevent or mitigate successful hostile actions against DoD personnel and resources when they are not directly engaged with the enemy. The bedrock of FP is an integrated base defense program designed to protect service members, civilian employees, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations. Threat assessment is the first step in FP planning, followed by selection and development of the appropriate FP countermeasures. The end result is an Air Force that has the best available protection, adjusted for risk, and ability to conduct its mission.

## CHAPTER 5

### AIR ADVISOR MISSION EXECUTION

**5.1. Purpose.** This chapter examines the aspects related to the execution phase of the AA team mission. This phase consists of pre-deployment, deployment, sustainment, and re-deployment actions that allow the AA team to implement the execution plan.

**5.2. Pre-Deployment Actions.** The AA should review DoD and DOS requirements for their PN and ensure they are accomplished prior to deploying.

#### **5.3. Deployment Actions.**

**5.3.1. Rotation Plan.** In coordination with the assigned major command (MAJCOM), a force rotation management plan should be constructed.

**5.3.2. Troop Movement.** Many extenuating circumstances must be evaluated in order to choose the appropriate force rotation management plan. Typically, the MAJCOM will use the current AEF tasking method. One method is the indeterminate length temporary duty, also known as the 365-day tasking. The advantage of a 365-day tasking is that relationship-building is at the core of AA, and building that rapport and those relationships takes time. The main disadvantage is the impact on the home station unit (unless the AA is assigned to a dedicated AA organization). Other rotation schedules than those discussed may be used, but in all cases, consideration needs be given primarily to the impact on AA effectiveness in the PN and the impact on the home station unit.

**5.3.3. Inter/Intra Theater Airlift.** Depending on the location AAs are departing from and/or arriving to, this could prove challenging. Each location may or may not have an established passenger terminal however; US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) priority to support the Joint Force Commander's campaign plan will dictate timeliness of any airlift.

**5.4. Sustainment Actions.** Long-term sustainment must be planned from the very beginning. A plan must be formulated to ensure a sufficient quantity of qualified AAs for the duration of the mission. For the most part this should be decided and managed by the MAJCOM, but the AA should be cognizant of the plan. Failure to consider sustainment will directly affect the experience level of incoming AAs and the effectiveness of the overall effort.

**5.4.1. Logistics.** This includes the movement of forces, acquisition of goods and supply chain management.

**5.4.2. Supply Chain Management.** Based on the information gathered in chapters two and four, supply chain management may present many challenges as well. A solid understanding of the different funding sources and the sources of power within the PN are key to resolving or mitigating supply chain issues.

**5.5. Redeployment Actions.** In order to effect a seamless transition, the AA should gradually relinquish as much information as possible to the PN noting the restrictions in para. 3.1. Clearly advertise the team's departure date, and leave plenty of time for significant and meaningful farewell activities. Redeployment efforts should be coordinated with the PN, US Embassy and the US Military Group at least 60 days in advance to ensure formalities including gift exchange are accomplished in accordance with USAF guidelines.

**5.5.1. Transfer of Forces.** The transfer of forces plan should ensure that all the AAs do not rotate out simultaneously. Consider staggering departure dates to ensure new AAs have time to learn their duties, while some of the experienced AAs remain behind to provide guidance and direction.

**5.5.2. Air Advisor Progress Reports.** Progress reports should be given approximately every 30 days to review metrics and interim results, discuss issues, capture lessons learned, and determine how well the mission is being executed. The AA progress reports ensure that supported combatant commanders and PN senior officials are provided an additional avenue for discovering lessons learned over the duration of the AA mission. These reports are essential to fostering crosstalk discussions, monitoring successful completion of interim milestones, and achieving desired operational capabilities and capacity. Optimally, a final AA mission debrief should be conducted NLT 30 days prior to the AA team's departure.

**5.5.3. After Action Report (AAR).** AARs document issues, best practices, and lessons learned from major exercises, operations, and experiments. AAs use these reports to record general mission information (e.g., dates, locations, participant units, organizations, etc.), issues and/or problems encountered, and lessons learned. The senior AA should consolidate unit inputs, validate observations, and submit a final report to the appropriate Numbered Air Force A9L NLT 30 days prior to AA mission termination.

## CHAPTER 6

### FUNDING & AUTHORITIES

**6.1. Purpose.** This chapter provides a brief detail of funding sources and authorities that impact the AA's role in Building Partner Capacity (BPC) operations. Some of the biggest challenges faced by AAs result from the distinctions between and overlap of DoD and DOS authorities and funding. Through security assistance programs, the USG supports military and security capabilities of strategic allies and partners by transferring military equipment and services, providing training for foreign militaries, and engaging in joint planning, exercising, and operating with foreign militaries and other security forces.

**6.2. Funding Authorities.** The DoD and DOS have important roles and equities in the formulation of policies and budgets. Security assistance encompasses the programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), with amendments, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA), "by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives." The transfer and provision of US defense articles and services to foreign nations is conducted in accordance with US law, regardless of the funding mechanism authorizing the transfer.

**6.2.1. Department of Defense.** The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) provides administrative and technical guidance for DoD security assistance programs. DSCA develops Foreign Military Finance (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs on a country-by-country and regional basis, negotiates agreements and contracts with recipient countries, and manages the process of acquiring US military equipment. DSCA produces handbooks and manuals. In addition, DSCA publishes long-term strategic plans for security assistance. DSCA also supervises Security Assistance Offices (SAOs) in recipient countries. The planning and resource allocation process for security assistance programs is complex, with overlapping responsibilities, as indicated in the paragraphs below. The geographical combatant command (GCC) also plays a role, developing regional plans for the security assistance programs, coordinating those plans with the US Embassy, and evaluating foreign government requests for military equipment and training.

**6.2.1.1. United States Code (U.S.C.) Title 10.** U.S.C., Title 10, legislates the Armed Forces and Uniformed Code of Military Justice. Certain security assistance related and security cooperation laws are governed by Title 10. There are serious legal restrictions on using U.S.C. Title 10 O&M funds. The AA must understand these restrictions as they apply to the mission. Title 10 Authorities, for the purpose of BPC, include the following:

**6.2.1.1.1. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).** (10 U.S.C. §§2341-2350) Provides funding for logistics support, supplies, and services provided on a reciprocal basis.

**6.2.1.1.2. ACSA for Significant Military Equipment.** Establishes temporary authority (Public Law (P.L.) 110-181 §1252) to extend and expand ACSA to lend military equipment to foreign forces in Iraq and Afghanistan for personnel protection and survivability.

**6.2.1.1.3. Cooperative Research, Development, Production and Support.** (AECA §27 (22 U.S.C. §2767); 10U.S.C. §§2350a, 2358; delegated to SECDEF (E.O. 11958, 18 Jan 1977, as amended) To standardize and make interoperable equipment of the US and PN, to

share work, technology, risks, costs and resulting benefits; to avoid duplicative defense acquisition efforts.

**6.2.1.1.4. Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP).** (10 U.S.C. §2249c) CTFP provides tailored combating terrorism educational programs to PNs in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in order to build their counterterrorism capacities and capabilities, help counter ideological support for terrorism, and create a global community of counterterrorism experts and practitioners.

**6.2.1.1.5. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA).** (10 U.S.C. §§401, 407) HCA is Service funded and all programs must provide a training benefit to US forces in the construction of infrastructure, the development of basic sanitation, to units conducting basic medical, dental, surgical and veterinary care.

**6.2.1.1.6. Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET).** (10 U.S.C. §2011) JCET provides training to US SOF and PN personnel, including basic skills and special operations techniques.

**6.2.1.1.7. Overseas Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA).** (10 U.S.C. §§402, 404, 2557, and 2561) OHDACA provides Used to provide: Unfunded space available transport of privately donated relief supplies, foreign disaster relief to nations, excess non-lethal DoD property, humanitarian assistance projects and activities, training of eligible personnel in demining techniques / mine risk education (provides training and access benefits to U.S. SOF).

**6.2.1.1.8. Regional Centers for Security Studies.** (10 U.S.C. §§184 and 1051 for all RCs; CHDS (§1050); APCSS (P.L. 107-248 §8073); GCMC (P.L. 103-337§113) Used to develop and maintain communications with military and defense leadership, and focus on national -level security issues.

**6.2.1.2. DoD Funds to Build Partner Capacity.** Certain funds and programs are established specifically for the DoD for the purpose of BPC. DoD funding programs for BPC include:

**6.2.1.2.1. Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF).** (Appropriated under P.L. 110-161, Div L; Authorized under P.L. 110-181 §1513w/concurrence of SecState) Provides equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, construction, and funding to the security forces of Afghanistan.

**6.2.1.2.2. Coalition Support Funds (CSF).** (P.L. 110-161, Div L) CSF reimburse Pakistan, Jordan and other key cooperating nations for logistical and military support provided, or to be provided to U.S. military operations in connection with military action in Iraq and GWOT.

**6.2.1.2.3. Combatant Commander Initiative Funds (CCIF).** (10 U.S.C. §166a) CCIF is used to conduct training for military personnel of partner nations, contingencies, selected operations, Joint exercises (including participating costs of PNs), Humanitarian and Civil Assistance (including urgent relief and reconstruction), force protection and personnel expenses.

**6.2.1.2.4. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR).** (P.L. 104-201 §1501) CTR provides assistance through contracts and grants to: dismantle weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, secure nuclear / chemical weapons and biological / missile materials, increase transparency.

**6.2.1.2.5. Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF).**

(Appropriated under P.L. 110-161, Dv L, Authorized under P.L. 110-181 §1512w/ concurrence of SecState) ISFF provides equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, construction, and funding to the security forces of Iraq.

**6.2.1.2.6. Build the Capacity of the Pakistan Frontier Corps.** (P.L. 110-181§1206) Used to enhance the ability of the Pakistan Frontier Corps to conduct counterterrorism operations along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

**6.2.1.2.7. Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) Supporting Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programs.** (10 U.S.C. §§168, 1051, 2010; P.L. 108-375 §1224) WIF provides Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations with monies for defense institution building, BPC through exposure to U.S. military concepts and exercises, assistance with to achieving their NATO partnership goals and interoperability with NATO and the U.S. It is also used to cover transportation costs to and from PfP exercises, incremental expenses in combined exercises, and conferences / seminars / exchanges / studies.

**6.2.1.2.8. Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) Status.** (10 U.S.C. §2350a) Benefits of this status include; priority delivery of excess defense articles, stockpiling US defense articles, cooperative research and development and use of FMF funds for commercial lease of defense articles.

**6.2.1.3. Other Title 10 Legal Authorities.** Title 10 provides other authorities to fund programs, including:

**6.2.1.3.1. Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).** (P.L. 110-181 §1205) Assists Combatant Commanders in addressing emergency civilian needs in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**6.2.1.3.2. DoD Counterdrug Program.** (P.L. 101-510 §1004, DoD Authorization Act 1991; P.L. 105-85 §1033, DoD Authorization Act 1998, expanded by P.L. 101-181 §1022; various DoD Authorization Acts provisions)Provides unreimbursed support to over 20 countries to stop the flow of illegal drugs.

**6.2.1.3.3. Global Train and Equip Program.** (P.L. 109-364 §1206) Provides equipment, supplies, and training to build the capacity of foreign national military forces to conduct counterterrorist operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in which U.S. forces participate.

**6.2.1.3.4. Logistics Support for Coalition Forces Supporting Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.** (10 U.S.C. §127c) Provides supplies, services, transportation (including airlift and sealift) and other logistical support to Coalition Forces supporting US military and stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**6.2.1.3.5. Security and Stabilization.** (Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA))The Secretary of Defense may provide services to, and transfer defense articles and services to facilitate the Secretary of State's provision of reconstruction, security, and stabilization assistance to a foreign nation.

**6.2.2. Department of State.** The DOS determines whether there shall be a security assistance program, sale, or export of equipment for a country and ensures the program effectively supports the foreign policy of the USG. The DOS Bureau of Political and Military Affairs relies on regional bureaus, ambassadors, and country teams in the recipient countries to coordinate planning, contracting, administration, and implementation of FMF, FMS, and IMET.

**6.2.2.1. U.S.C. Title 22.** Title 22 provides legislation governing official foreign relations and intercourse. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) are governed by Title 22. Specific programs governed by Title 22 AECA and FAA include:

**6.2.2.1.1. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)** (AECA §38 w/concurrence of SECDEF) Authorizes sales made by select US industries directly to foreign buyers. Not administered by the DoD.

**6.2.2.1.2. Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC).** (AECA §2 Supervision and General Oversight) The purpose of EIPC is to provide grant money (specifically FMF funds) to encourage countries to develop greater, more efficient capability to contribute to peacekeeping operations.

**6.2.2.1.3. Loans of Defense Equipment.** (22 U.S.C. §2311, Chapter 2 of Part II) Provides the authority for the US military to loan materials, supplies or equipment to NATO or Major Non-NATO allies.

**6.2.2.1.4. Foreign Military Sales (FMS).** (AECA §2 Supervision and General Oversight) Provides for government-to-government sales of military materials, supplies or equipment from DoD stocks.

**6.2.2.1.5. Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Demining Test and Evaluation Program.** (AECA §65) Provides capability to conduct actual mine clearance while evaluating demining equipment for possible acquisition.

**6.2.2.1.6. Drawdowns.** (FAA §506 (22 U.S.C §2318)); FAA §552(c) (22 U.S.C. §2348a(c)) Permits the drawdown of articles and services from DoD stocks for emergencies, disasters, counternarcotics, refugee assistance, peacekeeping operations, anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, and other operations.

**6.2.2.1.7. Excess Defense Articles (EDA).** (FAA, §516 (22 U.S.C. §2321j) grants and sales; AECA §21 (22 U.S.C. §2761) sales) Provides used US military equipment to foreign countries either by grant or sale.

**6.2.2.1.8. FAA § 451 Contingencies.** Authorizes use of funds made available to carry out any provision of the FAA to be used for unanticipated contingencies up to \$25M per fiscal year.

**6.2.2.1.9. FAA § 544 Exchange Training.** Provides for attendance of foreign military personnel at professional military education institutions in the United States.

**6.2.2.1.10. FAA § 607 Sales.** Allows US to furnish articles and services to friendly countries, international organizations, the American Red Cross, and voluntary nonprofit relief agencies.

**6.2.2.1.11. FAA § 614 Special Authority.** Authorizes furnishing of assistance under the FAA without regard to any provision of the FAA, AECA, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the US, and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under the FAA, in furtherance of the purposes of the FAA when the President determines and notifies Congress that to do so is important to US security interests.

**6.2.2.1.12. FAA § 632(b) Authority.** Provides the authority to use services, facilities, procure commodities, defense articles, military education and training on a reimbursable basis, from any agency of the USG as the President may direct, or with the consent of the Head of the agency.

**6.2.2.1.13. FAA § 660 Police Training.** Provides assistance, and restrictions, relating to the reconstituting of civilian police authority and capability in post-conflict restoration of PN infrastructure.

**6.2.2.1.14. War Reserve Stockpiles for Allies (WRSA).** (FAA §514) Allows stockpiling of US owned war reserve materiel during peacetime. Currently applies to Israel, South Korea, and Thailand.

**6.2.2.2. DOS Funding to BPC.** Specific programs are authorized for DOS support to BPC operations. These include:

**6.2.2.2.1. Economic Support Fund (ESF).** (FAA Part II Chapter 4) Creates employment and conditions conducive to international investment and trade. Used to support: Middle East peace (excluding Hamas), peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, and democratic institution building and economic growth in the western hemisphere.

**6.2.2.2.2. Foreign Military Funding (FMF).** (AECA §23 (22 U.S.C. §2763)) Provides funds to Partner Nations who then may use these funds for FMS and DCS with DSCA approval. Also funds such programs as Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP).

**6.2.2.2.3. International Military Education and Training (IMET).** (FAA §§541-543 (22 U.S.C. §2347)) Develops professional militaries and exposes foreign military and civilian personnel to democratic values and human rights.

**6.2.2.2.4. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).** (FAA §§481-490 (22 U.S.C. §§2291-2291j)) Supports country and global programs critical to secure the US and its allies against terrorist networks in illegal drug trade and international criminal enterprises.

**6.2.2.2.5. Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR).** (FAA Part II Chapter 8 (Anti Terrorism) and Chapter 9 (Non Proliferation and Export Control); FAA Part I Chapter 11; Freedom Support Act (22 U.S.C. §5801 et seq.)) Used to establish indigenous, sustainable humanitarian demining capability that will continue after direct US involvement is complete.

**6.2.2.2.6. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).** (FAA §§551-554 (22 U.S.C. §2348)) Provides the security assistance to help curtail conflict, enhancing states' ability to meet basic human needs and progress in governance, investing people, and economic growth.

**6.2.2.3. Other Title 22 Authorities.** Title 22 provides other authorities to fund programs, including:

**6.2.2.3.1. Leases of Defense Articles.** (AECA §61) Provides authority to lease defense articles to eligible countries if provided for; research, development, test and evaluation programs; military exercises, or communication or electronic interface.

**6.2.2.3.2. United Nations Participation Act (UNPA).** (22 U.S.C. § 287d-1) Provides assistance to UN operations in terms of noncombatant personnel (limit of 1000 DoD personnel), facilities and services.

**6.2.3. Procurement Exceptions.** AAs may need to purchase or contract for services, goods or equipment needed sooner than DoD timelines allow. Reasons include ease of delivery and timeliness. The AA team's designated contracting officer is trained to advise and vet issues through the appropriate channels such as Acquisitions Managers, SAF/IA, and the US DOS Liaison.

**6.3. Leveraging Donor Nations.** Other countries may assist the PN by providing logistical support, reconstruction assistance, equipment, training, sustainment or non-lethal support. In Afghanistan for example, a number of other nations have provided aid, funded reconstruction, built airfields and aviation support facilities, donated equipment, and trained personnel.

**6.3.1. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).** To obtain ODA funds: 1) ODA authorities must be convinced of the benefit to be gained working with local organizations; 2) the PN national government must support the effort; and 3) the project scope initially should be small and build the case for a larger, multiyear program.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

#### **References**

##### **Air Force Publications**

AFDD 2-3, *Irregular Warfare*, 1 Aug 2007.

AFDD 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*, 15 Sep 2007.

AFI 16-105 IP *Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT)*,  
[http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI16-105\\_IP.pdf](http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI16-105_IP.pdf)

##### **Joint and Department of Defense Publications**

JP 1. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. 14 Nov 2000.

JP 3-0. *Joint Operations*. 17 Sep 2006.

JP 5-0. *Joint Operation Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

##### **Related References**

CIWC Community of Practice (CoP)

<https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/ASPs/CoP/OpenCoP.asp?Filter=AC-OP-00-67>

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Technical Training

[http://www.dscamilitary.com/technical\\_training.htm](http://www.dscamilitary.com/technical_training.htm)

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Professional Military Education

[http://www.dscamilitary.com/professional\\_military\\_education.htm](http://www.dscamilitary.com/professional_military_education.htm)

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), IMET

[http://www.dscamilitary.com/programs/eimet/eimet\\_default.htm](http://www.dscamilitary.com/programs/eimet/eimet_default.htm)

Department of Defense (DoD) National Defense Strategy,

<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/2008NationalDefenseStrategy.pdf>

Defense Language Institute (DLI), Foreign language Center, <https://lmds.monterey.army.mil> or  
<https://lmds.dliflc.edu>

Defense Language Institute (DLI), Field Support Modules, <http://fieldsupport.lingnet.org/>

Joint Electronic Library, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs)

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), <http://www.govtrack.us/>

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), SOFA example,

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b510619a.htm>

## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

AA – Air Advisory  
AA HD – AA Handbook  
AAR – after action report  
AETC – Air Education and Training Command  
AEW – Air Expeditionary Wing  
AFCENT – Air Force Central Command  
AFSC – Air Force Specialty Codes  
AFSOC – Air Force Special Operations Command  
AECA – Arms Export Control Act  
BPC – Building Partnership Capacity  
C2 – command and control  
CAA – Combat Aviation Advisor  
CASEVAC – casualty evacuation  
CCC – Cross-Cultural Communications  
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency  
CIWC – Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence  
COCOM – Combatant Command  
CONUS – continental US  
DIME – Diplomatic/Political, Information, Military, and Economic  
DLI – Defense Language Institute  
DoD – Department of Defense  
DOS – Department of State  
DOTMLPF – doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities  
DSCA – Defense Security Cooperation Agency  
ELT – English language training  
FAA – Foreign Assistance Act  
FID – Foreign Internal Defense  
FMF – Foreign Military Financing  
FMS – Foreign Military Sales  
FP – force protection  
GCC – geographical combatant command  
GDI – gross domestic income  
GDP – gross domestic product  
GPF – general purpose forces  
IMET – International Military Education and Training  
IW – Irregular Warfare  
LOA – Letter of Offer and Acceptance  
LOR – Letter of Request  
MAJCOM – major command  
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NDAA – National Defense Authorization Act  
O&M – operations and maintenance  
OCONUS – outside continental US  
ODA – Overseas Development Assistance

OPR – Office of Primary Responsibility  
PAO – Public Affairs Officer  
PME – Professional Military Education  
PN – Partner Nation  
Pol/Mil – Political Military  
ROE – rules of engagement  
SA – Security Assistance  
SAF/IA – Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs  
SAO – Security Assistance Office  
SAR – Search and Rescue  
SFA – Security Force Assistance  
SOFA – Status of Forces Agreement  
SOS – Special Operations Squadron  
TSCP – Theater Security Cooperation Plan  
US – United States  
USACAPOC – US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command  
USAF – US Air Force  
USAF EC – US Air Force Expeditionary Command  
USAFSOS – US Air Force Special Operations School  
USAFWC – US Air Force Warfare Center  
U.S.C. – United States Code  
USG – United States Government  
USTRANSCOM – US Transportation Command