



NATO
OTAN

THE THREE SWORDS

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DJSE
DEPLOYABLE JOINT STAFF ELEMENT



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Cover – NATO “Deployable Joint Staff Element” concept by SGT Brandon Chhoeun, USA A, Civil Environment Section, Joint Exercise Division, Joint Warfare Centre.



Editorial

Dear Reader,

Already a hint of Spring in the air! Still, as it has been quite a while since I last wrote an Editorial, I would like to wish each and every one of you all the best for 2009. Throughout the year, your working day will compose of a mix of tasks such as providing leadership, delegating to employees, creating results, taking interest, giving guidance, asking questions, smiling, respecting the chain of command, giving encouragements, providing organization, showing consideration, challenging, understanding, motivating, praising, being gentle, making decisions, lending an ear to everybody, undergoing the annual physical test, noticing things, anchoring, showing flexibility, saying “Thank You”, being inclusive, showing attention, providing feedback, being humble, or being tough when need be, remembering names, showing empathy, respecting others, entertaining a meta-perspective, staying within budget, implementing, flashing a friendly smile at somebody, mastering your trade, ensuring you have a spotless reputation, celebrating small victories, remembering birthdays, making assessments, showing nearness... So, what are you waiting for, folks? Go out there and continue to make a difference!

In the previous edition of “The Three Swords”, this column encouraged you to challenge nature in Norway. To me, escaping into nature is a way to connect body and soul, calling forth associations that would not have been easily found if you had not been willing to put in the physical effort. Such associations also lend a new perspective on your own place in the world. As you go, you become part of the cosmos. You become a body mov-



ing about on the surface of the planet Earth, connecting with the energy of a lively white wagtail on a stone; an almost faded moon against a white sky; a stubborn, zigzag twig of heather cutting across the path you are on... Some American Indians talk about “walking in beauty” or “walking in the Holy Way”, which translates a fundamental experience: all that stands out as distinctly different when your mind shake off the cobwebs of your daily routines and you are walking the razor’s edge of presence, fully in the now.

Does anybody else have this experience?

You would all know, I am sure, some form of aphorism, some short, thought-provoking quote or statement. In conclusion, I would like to share with you some wisdom from the Swedish aphorist Stig Johansson: “**All those days that came and went, little did I know that they were life itself.**” ~ Carry his words with you through the day as you try to strike balance between work, family and leisure.

I do hope this edition of “The Three Swords” magazine will make for interesting and varied reading for you to dip into and learn from. I wish you all a happy Spring time!

Lt. Col. Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF,
Chief Public Affairs Office, Joint Warfare Centre

PUBLISH AN ARTICLE IN THE THREE SWORDS!
We are always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you have got something to say, send it to us. We will be happy to consider it for publication. Email your articles, as well as your comments and feedback to JWC CG PAO Common (CRONOS) or inci.kucukaksoy@jwc.nato.int.

The Three Swords

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PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A YEAR

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Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte German Army Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

EACH time I get the draft articles for a new *The Three Swords* magazine on my desk, I am positively surprised by the quantity and quality of your contributions. Along with it comes my sincere gratitude to all those, internal and external, who take the extra time and effort to give an account on a topic. These contributions to the magazine not only provide an insight, but enable us to keep the magazine a vital, up-to-date issue that is applicable to all.

As you read through this edition of the magazine you will find some very diversified articles such as CDR SG Dr. Marincic's (JTDD) thought-provoking article on the holistic view of the engagement space. You will also find the third part of Lieutenant Colonel Morgan's (US Air Force, Special Operations Command) "Catch 22 of ISAF" — an interesting examination of factors influencing the major actors in Afghanistan. There is a very interesting interview with Ms. Ayscha Hamdani, Political Advisor to NATO Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan. If you are further interested in ISAF, Lieutenant Colonel Lys (JED) describes many of the key figures of an ISAF Training Event with an overview of ISAF TE 09/1 that took place in December 2008 at the Joint Warfare Centre. Major Rowley (CDD) provides an educational article on the improved Air/Ground Mission Rehearsal Training for HQ ISAF staff in the framework of our ISAF Training Events.

Completing the range of articles with regard to our training is a remarkable insight from Ms. Claire Harkin on the "white side"; which is steadily employed in our exercises and training events, that displays a realistic training environment to the staffs we train. She not only describes the White Cell composition, but also participants, their role and challenges and really brings another dimension to the exercises we conduct.

As the Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) continues to be the way of the future, Colonel Attwood's (JTDD) article adds a sound overview of the DJSE concept; what it means and its implications. Not only is the article pertinent to the observers, trainers and subject matter experts; but anyone who has an



interest in DJSE.

While our work at the JWC continues as we know it, a significant change took place in the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) with the Change of Command of Vice Admiral Reksten. Vice Admiral Reksten relinquished command to Lieutenant General Harald Sunde who will lead the Norwegian Headquarters into the transition period for the move to Bodø. By 1 August 2009, the main portion of the NJHQ will operate from Bodø, while a smaller "rear party" will stay in Stavanger for approximately one more year. While we will not only lose many of our comrades and colleagues, we also will lose many of our friends.

The next quarter was extremely busy for the Joint Warfare Centre. In March, we conducted Exercise STEADFAST JOIST 09 (SFJT); training JFC Naples, and the Components in Madrid, Litchoro, Naples and Izmir, in a CJTF-type exercise, employing for the first time a DJSE provided by CC-Land Madrid.

While we still have a very busy quarter ahead, NATO marked its 60th Birthday of the Alliance at the Summit Meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Strasbourg and Kehl from 3-4 April 2009.

In late April, we will conduct another session of the Iraqi Key Leader Training (IKLT) with 16 Key Leaders from Iraqi Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). After the IKLT, we will conduct Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09 in late May, serving as a major step in the training and evaluation of NRF-13, under the lead of JC Lisbon. This exercise will also serve as the means for certifying CC-Land Heidelberg as a DJSE with Full Operational Capability (FOC).

And if that was not enough to fill your calendar, we will then train members of the SHQ rotation provided by 1st German/Netherlands Corps from Münster, plus Individual Augmentees in the ISAF TE 09/01 (June 09) prior to their deployment to Afghanistan. All that remains is to wish all of us a highly successful Spring! Enjoy reading this well-balanced issue of our magazine and keep up your excellent and appreciated work.

COVER STORY

By Colonel Charles Attwood, CAN AF, JWC Chief JTDD
 Photos by Raphael Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO

The Deployable Joint Staff and Joint Warfare



THE Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) is a concept borne from the realities of providing Command and Control (C²) of operations in today's security environment. The Level of Ambition outlined in Ministerial Guidance '06 requires the NATO Command Structure (NCS) to provide appropriate C² for a number of concurrent operations, including Major Joint Operations (MJO) and Smaller Joint Operations (SJO). In order to achieve the Level of Ambition, each Joint Force Command may necessarily be tasked to conduct concurrent operations. For success in such an ambitious endeavour, the assigned Commander will require a robust and flexible C² capability. With an increased focus on deployable, expeditionary capabilities coming at the same time as the

NATO Command Structure Peacetime Establishment Review, it was necessary to develop a concept that could realistically provide C² at the operational level, which was both feasible for the future and effective for current operations. The structural review endorsed the creation of the DJSE to enhance the deployability and usability of operational level command and control in the NATO Command Structure, with a view to replacing existing models.

The DJSE concept, reflecting an innovative and pragmatic approach to dealing with today's security environment, is clearly expeditionary in nature, and aims to provide a small agile Forward Command Element to establish the commander's presence quickly, while minimizing the in-theatre footprint. DJSEs are an appropriate means of enabling a



f Element Centre

mission-focused C² capability consistent with the general principle that execution should be stronger at Forward; and assessment/analysis stronger at Main HQ.

The DJSEs will be on a very short notice to move and, on a rotational basis, will be designated to support the NATO Response Force (NRF). Depending on the operational/strategic environment, the flexibility inherent in the model will enable the DJSE to remain in situ for the duration of the operation or be replaced on operations by a follow-on DJSE.

Being a compact package, the DJSE is to be supported and enabled by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency for capability packages and contractual logistics support; deployed CIS units from the NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency; and other mission-enabling units as required. Collaborative tools and functional services will also be key to success for the DJSE.

Basic preparations to develop the concept began in mid-2008, following the release of the Military Committee guidance. Allied Land Component Command (ALCC) Heidelberg, who will provide the first DJSE for certification, began fully fledged training in the Autumn of the

LEFT DJSE Overview briefing at the JWC Auditorium on 13 March 2009.

LEFT Briefers lectured on topics such as SOP structure, JLSG/RSOM review, JLSG responsibilities pre/post deployment, DJSE planning and DJSE exercise schedule.



same year. JC Lisbon, with full support from the JC Headquarters and ALCCs Heidelberg and Madrid, has had the lead in the development, testing and implementation of the new structure. A great deal has been accomplished in a very short time frame, and more lies ahead in anticipation of the certification of the first DJSE, provided by Heidelberg as part of NRF-13, during Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09 Phase III.

NATO's Component Commands have long had an affiliation with the Joint Headquarters (JHQs). However, the DJSEs provided by the NATO Force Structure have for the most part been land operations oriented. To enhance their abilities to function at the joint level, the DJSEs will profit from a robust set of Standard

ABOVE Lieutenant General Korte hosted JWC DJSE Seminar "DJSE Concept and Training Implications", 27 and 28 November 2008.

«DJSEs are an appropriate means of enabling a mission-focused Command and Control capability consistent with the general principle that execution should be stronger at Forward; and assessment/analysis stronger at Main HQ...»





ABOVE JWC Internal DJSE Seminar “DJSE Concept and Training Implications”, 27 and 28 November 2008, from left: BGen Kocian, DCOS Support CC Land Heidelberg; BGen Hunstok, Director OPD; MGen Rokos, former Director JFTC; Lt. Gen Korte, Commander JWC; Major General Gil-Ruiz, COS Joint Command Lisbon; BGen West, COS JWC; BGen Rossmannith, Chairman Deployed Forces Coordination Group, SHAPE.

«The DJSE is not a subordinate or intermediate level of command; it is complementary to the Main HQ. The intent is to ensure a single cohesive operational level staff, supported by synchronized structures and common processes and procedures. The DJSE is designed to perform those operational functions that must be conducted in theatre.»

Operating Procedures (SOPs). All three Joint Headquarters have been heavily involved in advancing the DJSE concept in general, with a particular investment in the cooperative development of SOPs. While the SOPs will provide a solid baseline of expectations, there will necessarily be exceptions to account for structural differences between the Joint Commands.

THE MODEL

The DJSE model consists of a deployed staff of approximately 210 personnel in three functional areas: a Forward Element, a Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) Core Staff Element, and a Forward Support Element. The DJSE is not a subordinate or intermediate level of command; it is complementary to the Main HQ. The intent is to ensure a single cohesive operational-level staff, supported by synchronized structures and common processes and procedures. The DJSE is designed to perform those operational functions that must be conducted in theatre. The main responsibility to set up the joint logistics posture rests with the operational level commander. The JLSG HQ element core staff will support the JFCs in developing the concepts and procedures necessary to ensure the correct theatre level logistics support. On order, the JLSG will be aug-

“The Deployable Joint Staff Element is to be in theatre as the deployed DJSE. The Forward Support Element and the Forward Support Element will remain direct

mented to a tailored size. The Forward Support Element will be responsible for ensuring Real Life Support, CIS, and force protection.

IMPLICATIONS FOR JWC

What does the DJSE concept mean for JWC? Clearly, our most comprehensive exposure to the concept will occur within the bounds of the STEADFAST series of exercises, the first occasion having been the crisis response planning phase of STEADFAST JUNCTURE in February of this year. However, work has been progressing apace at JWC outside of the exercise environment in preparation for our support to ACO’s training responsibilities, on behalf of Allied Command Transformation. For example, a Bi-SC Implementation Working Group has been established in recognition that a coordinated and coherent approach to implementing this new Command and Control concept would be best realized by incorporating the perspectives of both of the strategic commands. JWC has had ongoing representation at the Working Group.


Secondly, in consideration of the potential challenges ahead, COM JWC hosted a seminar of interested parties in late November of 2008, with the aim of better informing key JWC personnel on the status of DJSE developments, and its implications for JWC. Joining the JWC personnel were representatives from SHAPE, Joint Force Training Centre, Joint Command Lisbon, Allied Land Component Command Heidelberg, and the Operational Preparation Directorate (OPD). The seminar provided a



element is an operational level HQ element designed as a joint staff for an operational level commander. A DJSE does not represent a separate level of C² as the Component HQ is directly subordinate to the operational level commander. ▶

great opportunity over a two-day period to discuss issues such as the origins of the concept; the degree and nature of the cooperative work between the three joint commands; the implementation and employment of the DJSEs; perspectives from the provider of the DJSEs; DJSE processes and structures; certification of the DJSE; and some round table discussions on the training of these new operational elements.

Thirdly, we followed up with an internal training day in March, just prior to Exercise STEADFAST JOIST Phase III, to



ensure a common level of understanding of the concept as it currently stands, across JWC.

Outside of the above mentioned events, our ongoing focus has been on studying the content of the SOPs. One must understand that much of the practical “proving” work on this new concept has already been undertaken via methods such as the Battle Staff Training. So, while the DJSE will be new to us at the Joint Training Level, it will be more familiar to those working at the coalface. Until we from JWC get a chance to actually see the templated structure play out, we will have been working in the domain of the theoretical. However, even at that, we are aware that challenges lie ahead of us and have been taking measures to address them.

JWC’s Capability Development Division clearly will have the lead in our contributions to the doctrinal development related to the DJSE, while the Joint Training Development Division (JTDD) will continue with its traditional role of providing Observer/Trainers to the various training audiences.

JTDD is composed primarily of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) whose experiences lie within the traditional J-code structures. Even a cursory examination of the new DJSE concept reveals a considerable change in the traditional organization of a Joint HQ. For example, what we clearly understood as an ops organization (J3, J5, J3/5) is replaced by an organization now known as the Operations Directorate in JHQ Main, including a Plans Branch; an Effects Management Branch; an Assessment Branch;



ABOVE The JWC DJSE Overview briefers from top: Colonel Attwood, Lt. Colonel Vigneau and Lt. Colonel Turner.



“Internal considerations as to whether JWC needs to make significant changes to training, has led us to the conclusion that within the STEADFAST series of exercises for a further five years, there exists sufficient flexibility in scenarios, settings, and a wide opportunity to exercise the concept, according to their specific needs.”



a Synchronization and Execution Branch; and a Situation Centre. With the increasing importance of the Effects Based Approach to Operations, and PMESII analysis, disciplines such as CIMIC and Info Ops may increase in prominence in the new construct. For JWC, one of our first priorities will be a close examination of the structure of our training teams to ensure that we are putting the right expertise in the right location to meet the training demands of the DJSE structure. That work is currently underway. While we can be confident that we have the capacity to address the associated needs, what we will be looking to accomplish during STEADFAST JOIST is how best

LEFT, BELOW BGeneral West, US AF, COS JWC, STEADFAST JUNCTURE 08; JWC EXCON STEADFAST JOIST 09.


to organize our resources against the challenge. The training and readiness of the DJSE is the responsibility of the commanders of the NATO Force Commands and the NATO JFCs. The envisioned training follows a building block approach comprising Individual Training, Functional Area Training, Integrated Training, preparatory exercises and major joint exercises, like STEADFAST JUNCTURE. JWC’s involvement really commences with the joint level exercise process, as detailed in the MTEP. Phase II of STEADFAST JUNCTURE, with JC Lisbon and its NRF components, gave JWC Observer/Trainers their first real look at the concept at work, albeit in the planning mode. The necessity for frequent close liaison and interaction between the JHQ, its components and DJSE elements was very apparent, particularly when using an Effects-Based Approach. The execution phase of STEADFAST JOIST, with the JFC functioning under deployed “operational” conditions, will permit JWC to make further observations pertinent to its role in supporting this important change to the way NATO goes about its operational business.

FOCUS AREAS

Internal considerations as to whether JWC needs to make significant changes to our support to joint level training has led us to the conclusion that within the STEADFAST series of exercises, currently planned out for a further five years, there exists sufficient flexibility in scenarios, settings, etc., to provide commanders wide opportunity to exercise the concept,



s to our support to joint level exercises, currently planned out etc., to provide commanders



according to their specific needs. Based on observations from previous exercises, close examination of the SOPs and discussions with involved parties across NATO, we have identified key aspects of the DJSE concept on which to focus our training effort. Those items include:


- the command and control working relationships within the JFC and with external units and HQs;
- the development of the Commander's situational awareness, including fusion and maintenance of varied operational inputs;
- the use of boards and their links to the Commander;
- the handling of reports and returns from higher, adjacent and subordinate

units and agencies;

- the assessment process.

JWC is also committed to providing the maximum possible support to the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre with the view to contributing to the refinement of the concept. There is no question that the DJSE concept poses many challenges as we proceed to implementation. JWC is very excited about being involved with such an important aspect of NATO's transformational effort and looks forward to contributing towards its successful conclusion. ✦

ABOVE Captain Furness, GBR N, Chief JWC JED, in discussion with General (Ret.) Reith, Exercise STEADFAST JOIST 09.



DJSE KEY ASPECTS

- The command and control working relationships within the JFC and with external units and HQs;
- The development of the Commander's situational awareness, including fusion and maintenance of varied operational inputs;
- The use of boards and their links to the Commander;
- The handling of reports and returns from higher, adjacent and subordinate units and agencies;
- The assessment process.

HOLISTIC VIEW OF THE ENGAGEMENT SPACE

By CDR Dr. Dusan Marincic, SVN N,
JTDD, JPECS SME
Joint Warfare Centre

» **The old comfort of civil and military labels risks misleading us, because there is no such easy division in the environments we face.**

WITH the introduction of an in-theatre Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) structure and processes at the end of December 2008, NATO HQs have had to develop further in order to create staff procedures aligned to global security challenges. Main intention of this article is to clarify some activities and consequences that underline an assessment process in light of the DJSE concept.

After World War II, until 2007, the International Community (IC) was

confronted with 224 conflicts, out of which 179 (80 percent) were intrastate and 45 interstate (Uppsala University, 2008). Thus, domestic conflicts represent the majority of contemporary security crises in the world, and they often cause the disintegration of political balance in a certain region. From a historical perspective, security has been a fundamental value of human interactions, which was institutionalized by the rise of the sovereign state and the global system of states. Contemporary security patterns deal with individual


security, national security, international security and global security. By collecting data holistically in the area of complex emergency, staffs can make analysis or synthesis of available indicators of the fundamental societal security dimensions.

rity dimensions: political; economic; medical; environmental; criminal and military; information and other threats to the modern society. Interaction among mentioned dimensions could be defined as a comprehensive security, which is reference for the expression "holistic view of the engagement space".

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

Security could be defined in an objective sense as an absence of threats to the societal values, and in subjective sense as an absence of apprehension that these values will be endangered. Martin Edmonds ("Armed Services and Society", Leicester University Press, 1988) writes that the best security condition is a prediction of future events in order to execute appropriate preparations. Comprehensive security is comprehending planning and decision making about activities, which will ensure, together with the available sources, solutions for expected and unexpected threats to the security dimensions.

After the end of the Cold War political science understands security as a holistic spectrum of following secu-



**Social
Conditions**



Crowd & Riot Control training, Camp Novo Selo - Belgian squad chases rioters after having broken through burning barricades. Photo by KFOR PAO.



and the socio-economic welfare of society and individuals. The worst crises developments are a result of the extreme intensification of threats in one societal dimension, which is contributing to the increased intensity of security threats on other societal dimensions. There is either a combination of crises in many security dimensions or a combination of threats from the many dimensions. Military engagements of high intensity have a direct or indirect impact on intensification of criminal activities, terrorism, environmental, economic, medical, political, identity, information and other security threats and vice versa. A complex security threat to society is, in this case, a threat with the complex cause (from many dimensions) and with the complex effects (on other dimensions). Because of those facts it is of utmost importance to use a comprehensive approach to the comprehensive security and to understand security environment of the engagement space.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Comprehensive approach is a term which recognizes the need to

act together in the area of responsibility and refers to the collaborative context in which the various stakeholders are used. Using an analogy, the comprehensive approach may be seen as a braided rope, in which analysis, planning, decision-making and execution processes of the many organizations are entwined together from the beginning, and run through the entire spectrum of the effort both in horizontal and vertical interactions. This implies that each actor understands its capabilities and its role in the overarching plan, where it is highly probable that NATO will be the supporting rather than the supported command.

At the centre of the peace forces and others' preoccupations, the population constitutes a major player in stabilization. The support of the local population for the activities of military forces is therefore a prerequisite to success in stabilization. *Hearts and minds* must be won in the period immediately after the deployment of forces, which is a very small *window of opportunity*. In a situation where the social structures are often degraded and where the state appara-

tus is in decline, or has even disappeared, formal and informal networks quickly arise and fill the administrative and security gaps. In order to increase efficiency of operations, we need to establish new methodical and applicable forms of cooperation, coordination and analysis in the areas of complex emergency. The expected outcome includes recommendations for better results that are necessary for societal reconstruction of the affected society. Holistic societal analysis therefore requires the proper selection of demographic, social, political, economic and environmental variables at the municipality/province level in order to measure

the potential of each security dimension and local capability for societal reconstruction as a whole.

We have to understand the individual perception of security, family and tribal dynamics and finally the capabilities of the local governance network from the societal dimensions perspective (*Figure on Page 10, "Societal Security"*). That leads us to a holistic view of the engagement space and a better understanding of the affected society.

Since the end of the Cold War, global peace has been interrupted by numerous conflicts requiring international intervention and the deployment of military, police and civil organizations in peace operations to almost every region in the world. At the same time the media and the public are continuously watching the military, politicians, and other decision-makers in whatever they do. There is not a single day that the media does not cover events in crisis areas and quite often the focus is on the International Community in its attempts to improve the overall security situation. Wherever complex emergency operations are employed, the




Joint Assessment Process

International Community's efforts are affected by many internal and external influences varying from local politics, media, population demands, different international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), just to mention a few. Right or wrong, the IC sometimes receives blame for its failure to create a stable and secure environment.

Rebuilding societies is one of the most complex and important challenges the International Community faces today. It is absolutely critical to identify areas for improvement to reach the desired end-state of a return to normalcy in a more efficient way ensuring the future commitment of the International Community at large to solve challenges elsewhere. A more structured approach is there-



"Rebuilding societies is one of the most complex challenges the International Community faces today." Photos by ISAF PAO.



fore essential in order to enhance sustainable development for an affected society, based on a return to normalcy, which is the ultimate end-state. This normalcy includes a sustainable security, reconciliation and a structured society, which guarantees the basic needs for the local population.

Military forces are essential in the initial stabilization phase, since other organizations might not be ready for deploying or are not functioning ef-

fectively yet. A transition to civil authorities, whether international or eventually national, requires a clear political decision on the required end-state, a clear prioritized list of essential functionalities to be established and, above all, an integrated approach through coordination, which has to start well before the International Community addresses the conflict. This coordination should take into account the strengths and weaknesses of all parties involved (IOs, governmental organizations, major NGOs and the military), an open mind for possible solutions, creativity and lessons learned from the previous operations. The key to

effective coordination lies in joint civil-military mission planning. One of the common planning platforms for the civil-military cooperation should be intelligence activity, which could provide shared and accessible data bases for involved civil and military components in the area of complex emergency. One of the possible methods and tools in NATO for above mentioned coordination is preparation and execution of *STEADFAST* exercises for crisis response operations.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

With respect to the application of the DJSE concept and implementation of an EBAO methodology in the planning and execution of the *STEADFAST* exercises, it is essential to start with the training audience's interaction and the joint coordination process earlier than advised in the GOP (2005). One of the examples is



the joint assessment process, which is now requesting a strong contribution from POLAD, as political science has been providing a holistic view of the engagement space. This challenge increases with the fact that the Knowledge Management Directorate, the Joint Assessment Branch, the Joint Plans Branch, the Joint Effects Management Branch and the Joint Coordination Cell have to develop campaign assessment in a holistic manner. Nations will need to provide proper expertise in the future in order to implement the DJSE concept in the optimal way.

Another example is parallel and collaborative planning among Joint Force Command (JFC) and Component Command (CC), which has to converge at the end of the process into one synchronized operational plan and joint coordination order. Because of the detail required in defining tasks and the necessary actions for the achievement of desirable effects in the area of operation, there is a need to define joint synchronization points, deliverables and activities, which should take place during the planning process.

I would like to emphasize that exchange of Liaison Teams (LNO) horizontally and vertically is even more important now than it has ever been before. Each commanding level must

have a mutual understanding of staff procedures throughout the initiation, orientation, mission analysis and concept development. During the two week period, training audience must exercise permanent vertical and horizontal interactions and synchronization of their planned activities in order to create a coherent and effective OPLAN for the exercise execution. The JFC should be responsible for managing the planning process and overall synchronization by introduction of controlling measures.

Recent exercises demonstrated that each procedural delay at the joint level multiplied workload and frustration at the Component level. A good example for handling this issue was a VTC among planners from JFC and CCs, where the operational planning groups exchanged their views and dilemmas. This demonstrates the requirement for improvements in definition of LNO roles and structure.


As was already mentioned, the DJSE is bringing a much bigger role for assessment than in the past. The Joint Assessment methodology should be established and understood at the beginning of the Operational Planning Process. OPGs must try to gain an initial holistic view on engagement space in order to create a proper operational design with the effects, operational objectives

and assessment elements, such as Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Performance (MOP).

With the introduction of PMESII or DIME methodology it is even more important to bring an initial situation of the engagements space. For example, by using 42 variables from five societal security dimensions in Kosovo (demography, social, and economy, political, environmental) it is possible to project an initial situation in holistic way. Figure below shows three distinct groups of municipalities selected by multivariate analysis (cluster analysis method) in order to measure their capabilities for sustainable development. By doing this the Assessment Branch is creating a common understanding of security needs in the engagement space.


Recognized security needs in the area of operation represent foundations for the planning of the desired effects and operational objectives. During the execution of an operation, the joint assessment network should use the same assessment methodology and compare the initial security situation with further operational and societal developments of the engagements space. As shown in the figure below, it is possible to assess the efficiency of an operation, and contribution of the forces to the overall sustainable development

Local Capability Kosovo 2004



“By using 42 variables from five societal security dimensions in Kosovo (demography, social, and economy, political, environmental) it is possible to project an initial situation in holistic way.”

Local Capability Kosovo 2008



of affected society. Comparative analysis of different security situations can help staff to understand the improvements in the engagement space and the need for further refinement of OPLAN. Multivariate analysis of Kosovo in 2004 and 2008 shows that the International Community helped to improve the situation in two municipalities, Podujevo, which is today in the group of capable municipalities, and Prizren, which belongs today to the very capable group for sustainable development in Kosovo.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary operations are conducted in a very complex environment. This normally involves a failed state, or limited governance, overlaid with a diverse population (ethnic/culture/religion/urban vs. rural), asymmetric attack and criminality. Further overlaid with other actors in theatre; IOs, NGOs, media, independent security companies, local police and militia and logistic contractors, all with their own agendas. There is no tem-

plate for dealing with this. In terms of cause and effect, the military can only deal with the effect, primarily providing sufficient security; the International Community, IOs and NGOs should deal with the cause through improving governance and law and order, and assisting in research and development process. What the military can do in this is to harmonise, cooperate and collaborate with other actors, in order to influence them towards achieving synergy. But we cannot integrate or coordinate, as we have no authority over them. The old comfort of "civil" and "military" labels risks misleading us because there is no such easy division in the environments we face. Challenges in theaters such as Afghanistan and Iraq demand an integrated response, drawing on civil-military ingredients in a "force mix" that derives from early analysis of the desired "end-state" and the tools required to achieve it.

The military will only ever be one part of that response, which has to be designed in conjunction with civil-

ian actors from the beginning, including planning and execution processes. Prescription of a holistic view on an engagement space needs not only quantitative but also qualitative changes in NATO HQ staff procedures. *STEADFAST* exercises should encourage the establishment of the coordination process before the beginning of the operational planning process and maintenance of the operational tempo until the end of exercise. Of utmost importance is to create an early joint assessment methodology with visible involvement of POLADs and a common understanding of the assessment framework and requested deliverables with a holistic view of the engagement space.

Secondly, collaborative and parallel planning should be defined by joint synchronization points, deliverables and activities, which converge to joint products. It will take some time for the nations to provide proper expertise for the DJSE structure and processes, but that is necessary for the efficient contribution of NATO forces to contemporary security solutions. ✦

Soldiers of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) talk with Kandahar city residents to see the needs and living conditions during a patrol. Photo by SHAPE PAO.





The CATCH 22 of ISAF

By Lt. Col. Keith Morgan, US AF Special Operations;
Instructor, Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corp,
Iowa State University



A dynamic look at ISAF operations in Afghanistan – Part III

« For this analysis to be accurate, those conducting the wargaming must consider operations from the perspective of friendly, enemy and third party players.

IN “CATCH 22” Parts I & II published in the last edition of *The Three Swords*, 22 major factors that influence the environment of the on-going insurgency in Afghanistan were identified and organized. If NATO staff officers only had to consider one of these factors at a time, planning and operations in Afghanistan would be relatively easy, but as discussed previously, inputs to one factor often create cascading effects across the other factors. Therefore, the analysis conducted in the first two parts of this article is only half of the story.

The last part of this article, Part III, provides a process to analyze the interaction of the previously identified factors and uses graphs to illustrate their impact on the Afghan environ-

ment. The graphs are also an indispensable tool for commanders and staffs to help people, both up and down the chain-of-command, conceptualize the interaction of the 22 different factors and to see how the military plan achieves political goals. As in the first parts of “Catch 22”, Part III recommends little that is new, instead current processes will be expanded upon and combined to provide more in-depth analysis and better tools for communicating decisions.

We begin by drawing upon current wargaming processes used by military staffs to evaluate different Courses of Action (COAs) developed to meet the commander's objectives. It is designed to be an objective process to identify the strengths and weakness of each COA and



provide the commander the information he/she needs to select the best COA for execution.

There are various techniques to conduct wargaming, some use different evaluation criteria such as the principles of war for evaluation of the different COAs. The staffs develop a matrix or table with criteria along one side of the matrix, and the COAs along the other. The evaluation process involves subjectively assigning values for the effectiveness of each COA to satisfy the chosen criteria. Then, the values for the criteria of a COA are summed up to objectively identify which one should most effectively meet the commander's intent, see the example in *Table 1* below.

In this example, COA 3 should be the best choice and also it demonstrates that COA 3's areas of weakness would likely be in Criteria 1 and 3. This information identifies areas of strengths and weakness of a plan so staffs can monitor the plan as it is executed. The process described above is mainly used for operational level plans and it typically looks out over maybe the next six months.

The first proposal of this paper is to expand this process to look out over many years and to execute it in an iterative manner to analyze how changes within the Afghan Counter Insurgency (COIN) environment affect the overall situation. It builds upon Part I and II of this article, which identified factors affecting the major actors in Afghanistan (ISAF, GOA, Taliban) and their ability to use military power to obtain to their desired end state. The recommended proc-

ess relies on subjective evaluations to feed an objective process as does the current wargaming process. This recognizes there is no formula to precisely predict things like the impact of collateral damage on the populations of Afghanistan, and within the Troop Contributing Nations, but planners should and must forecast their influence within the Afghanistan environment. For this analysis to be accurate, those conducting the wargaming must consider operations from the perspective of friendly, enemy and third party players. Therefore, this activity depends heavily on the Operational Analysis (OA) branch of any headquarters and requires the use of what is called the Comprehensive Approach, which involves the participation of many personnel and agencies from outside the military.

As the first two articles have shown, in an insurgency such as the one in Afghanistan there are linkages all the way from strategic to tactical factors with political, social, and economic implications. Military planners are rarely knowledgeable on the influence of their proposed plans in these non-military areas and experts from these fields must be consulted early to allow them the time to accurately evaluate the impacts of proposed plans. Essentially, these non-military players must be involved in the planning process from the start.

What makes this process different from those being currently used is; first, it starts with an evaluation of all factors, at all the levels of command (like the 22 factors identified in this paper) – second, current wargaming

«As the first two articles have shown, in an insurgency such as the one in Afghanistan, there are linkages all the way from strategic to tactical factors with political, social and economic implications.»

rarely attempts to capture the results for all the actors in the theatre in one product – third, the analysis is conducted in an iterative manner over the long-term. This will result in producing wargaming tables for each of the major players using the factors identified in Parts I and II at a regular interval, such as for every six months out to approximately five years.

An example of this, focusing on ISAF is shown next using only two COAs. COA 1 could be to continue without making any changes and COA 2 could be to significantly increase U.S. troop strength. This is an abbreviated representation of the wargaming table. It could be based on a scale from "1 to 5" with "1" being a very negative effect to "5" being a very positive effect.

This process would be done for the same period for the GOA and Tali-

Table 1: Example COA Evaluation
1 is least favorable and 5 is most favorable

	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3
Criteria 1	2	2	1
Criteria 2	1	0	5
Criteria 3	4	3	2
Total	7	5	8



Table 2: Example Wargaming Table for ISAF for July 2009

	COA 1	COA 2
Expenditure of Resources	3	2
Collateral Damage	2	1
Taliban Losses	1	4
Improved Tactical Guidance	3	5
Total	9	12

ban. It would also be done for all the actors for the periods of December 2009, July 2010, December 2010, on out to December 2014. The reason this wargaming must be done iteratively is that the impact of these factors may change over time. For instance, the impact of the "Expenditure of Resources" may become more negative over time as the populace of Troop Contributing Nations tire of the tax burden of ISAF operations.

Conversely, when wargaming is conducted for December 2010, the impact of COA 2, increasing troop levels, might result in a significant reduction in the Taliban's capabilities through attrition of their troops and command structure for a year. It is imperative this process is conducted for each actor in an iterative matter over a long period time to provide the data needed for the next phase of analysis.

The next step is to plot the results of this wargaming in a graph as depicted in Figure 1. In this example, COA 1's main objective is to continue to help the GOA by concurrently develop a secure environment within Afghanistan through the reduction of Taliban military strength and the development of indigenous Afghan military strength. Figure 1 represents a possible overlay of the current interactions of the previously identified 22 issues. The green dashed/dotted line (ISAF 1) represents ISAF's military capability alone. It starts with the initial moderate build up of NATO military strength to counter the Taliban insurgency at the start of the ISAF mission, followed by a drop-off of ISAF troops


as the strength of the Afghan National Army (ANA) grows. In this overlay the ANA, represented by the dashed/dotted blue line (ANA 1), increases in strength through the efforts of ISAF and the international community to train and resource them. The red dotted line, (ISAF/ANA 1), represents the combined military capability of the ISAF and ANA, which grows with the introduction of ISAF troops and development of the ANA, but falls off as ISAF troops leave. It then starts to grow again as the ANA continues to grow in strength due to its own training efforts. The black solid line, (Taliban 1), represents Taliban military power, which is initially brought down quickly through the actions of the newly introduced ISAF troops, but the trend in the reduction of Taliban strength is reduced as the sum

of ISAF/GOA military effectiveness starts to decrease as the ISAF troops redeploy home.

The graphing of the effects of a COA like this can be helpful by itself as it can be used to illustrate to both the command staff and political leadership the effects of the plan overtime. Furthermore, it starts to pictorially provide a military staff the overall military intent of the commander not just in terms of results expected for friendly forces, but it also describes the intended effects for the enemy and third party players of the plan.

Most importantly, the identification of Point 1 is critical for the risk management of military operations as it represents the point of greatest risk to the NATO mission in Afghanistan – the point where the combined ISAF/GOA military effectiveness is closest

Figure 1: COA 1 - Maintain current plan in Afghanistan




to the Taliban military effectiveness. At this point, even a small downward change in the ISAF/GOA military effectiveness (through for example a major player within ISAF withdrawing its troops or significant political instability within the Karzai government due to failed national elections) or an upward move in the Taliban military effectiveness (through increased support from outside agencies or better tactics) is most likely to create the conditions for mission failure.

While graphing the effects of a COA is useful, it does not take full advantage of this process. The key is to do this process for all COAs or possible significant events within an operation. For example, *Figure 2* represents what might happen should more troops be deployed to Afghanistan (similar to what the U.S. did in Iraq through the introduction of more troops).

In this scenario, ISAF focuses more troops on direct offensive operations against the Taliban, and due to constrained resources, ISAF shifts forces in the theater away from training the ANA. *ISAF 2* rises more steeply as more troops and greater offensive operations allow ISAF's military effectiveness to climb at a greater rate than in *ISAF 1*. These offensive operations should also reduce Taliban military effectiveness at a greater rate

Figure 2: Increased troop levels



than in the first graph and this is represented by the downward shift of Taliban power to *Taliban 2*. Planners may also postulate an additional positive aspect of this strategy may be that ISAF troops can withdraw faster from the theater, as Taliban effectiveness is reduced more quickly. Conversely, planners may postulate the military effectiveness of ISAF may be driven down mid and long term as anticipated higher casualties for ISAF will cause support for the mission to decrease within the Troop Contributing Nations.

In this same scenario, the Afghan Nation Army's (ANA) strength would increase more slowly because ISAF devotes more resources to direct actions against the Taliban vice trying to build ANA strength, as represented by the decrease in the slope of ANA 2. Furthermore, the risk of increased civilian casualties may also erode the military effectiveness of the GOA, as it may create a backlash against the government.

The final bit of analysis that can be conducted on this graph is to look at *Point 2* in the second graph, which again represents the overall risk to the NATO mission for this new Course of Action. As in the first graph this point

identifies where ISAF/GOA military effectiveness is closest to Taliban effectiveness. Examining the movement of the points laterally and vertically on the charts can be useful as it can help educate people not involved in the planning on how the plans will be different during execution. More importantly, comparing the amount of space between the lines for each COAs (i.e. the delta between ISAF/GOA and Taliban power) is the key as it represents how close ISAF comes to failure for each plan.

The last step of this process combines the individual overlays into one comprehensive graph. In our example, *Figure 3* is a combination of *Figure 1* and *Figure 2*, and it allows planners to conduct a direct comparison of the two possible scenarios.

This overlay demonstrates how the military effectiveness of each of the actors will be different at each point in time for the two plans. Additionally, the graphical displays can be used to explain to military and non-military audiences how the fight will be different if a proposed COA is adopted. It can also be used to help establish realistic expectations in the political arm of NATO and the Troop Contributing Nations by describing

«The use of iterative wargaming and their transformation into graphs which are overlaid provide staffs the ability to directly compare one Course of Action against others.»





Many say this process is not worth the time and resources as it attempts to predict the unpredictable. By saying this, these people relinquish the outcome of operations to fate and destiny.

concepts like how it may be better to accept more casualties initially to allow for an earlier redeployment of troops. The most important aspect of this technique is the illustrated comparison of the gap at *Point 1* to the gap at *Point 2*. In the example represented by *Figure 3*, it is visually easy to see there is a smaller gap (greater risk of mission failure) at *Point 1* than *Point 2*. In this hypothetical example, it signifies there is more risk to the mission by continuing with the current plan (COA 1) as opposed to adopting a more offensive strategy (COA 2).


Once a plan is chosen, the graphs can be used to identify Measurements of Effectiveness to allow staffs the ability to judge the effectiveness of the selected plan. Staffs can gather data on the factors previously identified in Parts I and II of this article to determine if conditions change as predicted. In COA 2, Measurements of Effectiveness could be evaluated to determine if there is a more rapid decrease in Taliban effectiveness as ISAF troops concentrate on offensive operations, while also conducting monitoring of the growth of ANA power to ensure it does not fall below the planned level. But, conducting the analysis outlined in these three

articles will not be easy.

To execute this process correctly requires significant investment in terms of building an Operational Analysis (OA) team. For COIN operations, such as those in Afghanistan, military planners will have to reach out to build a multi-disciplinary Operational Analysis team capable of understanding the social, cultural, and military aspects of the operation. Most would take

this to mean the social and cultural aspect of Afghanistan, but readers must not forget many of the factors identified at the strategic level were tied directly to how the populace of the Western Troop Contributing Nations views ISAF operations. This drives the need for the Operational Analysis team to have sociologist and political analyst on the team to look at the situation both within home front

Figure 3: Combined Overlays





of the Troop Contributing Nations and Afghanistan. Once the initial analysis is done, the Operational Analysis team cannot be completely disbanded. On the contrary, at least part of the team will have to conduct periodic reviews of the results of operations to see how they compare to those predicted. Furthermore, events completely outside the ISAF mission can change the environment within Afghanistan. These changes must be continually tracked to ensure plans are adjusted appropriately.

CONCLUSION

Through a holistic examination of the factors influencing the three major actors in Afghanistan, military leadership and planners now have a framework to help them recognize, organize, and understand key issues and their linkages. This final article has provided readers a process to conduct third and fourth order analysis and to illustrate the effects of different Courses of Action. Hopefully, this information and these processes can be used to educate personnel on the environment they will face before they deploy to Afghanistan and provide them an analytical frame-

work to solve problems at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.

Furthermore, the processes to organize and display the environmental factors within matrices can be used to help describe the environment to politicians and all levels of the military commands. The use of iterative wargaming and their transformation into graphs, which are overlaid provide staffs the ability to directly compare one COA against others.

Finally, these graphs can be translated into Measurements Of Effectiveness, which can continually inform the commander and political leadership of the progress of the plan. It will not be an exact science, but if it is properly supported with OA resources it will provide more rigors to the planning and execution of operations. Many will say this process is not worth the time and resources as it attempts to predict the unpredictable. By saying this, these people relinquish the outcome of operations to fate and destiny. NATO must invest in this process or it will lack the tools to properly serve the men and women of ISAF and it will accept significantly increased risk of failure in Afghanistan. †

Photos by ISAF PAO



DON'T FIGHT THE WHITE

By Clare Harkin
Conflict and Stability Advisor



In the face of an insurgency it is the support of the people of the country that determines the outcome. If you want to influence the outcome, it is key that all actors, whether they are military or civilian, fully understand the cultural, historical, political and social environment in which they operate. Without this understanding, they risk exacerbating tensions and perpetuating rather than addressing the factors which fuel the conflict. Gains painfully won may be unintentionally destroyed by a single uniformed act which, in another context, would be completely harmless.

And such are the complexities of working in any country which has suffered years if not decades of conflict, poverty and injustice that no one party has the capacity or knowledge to deal with the myriad and multi-faceted challenges that have to be tackled. International actors have to work in partnership and with the indigenous population to deliver the stability necessary to promote social, economic and political growth. Fortunately, this has been recognized by most. But, adapting to this approach and effecting the necessary changes to working practices and institutional cultures has been and

continues to be considerably more difficult to achieve. Despite all the years of working alongside each other in many different conflict-affected countries, there remains a lack of knowledge about the limitations and capabilities of respective actors and their mandates. This is often accompanied by a lack of trust between military and civilian actors and a rigid belief in the supremacy of their respective approaches. Hardly a basis upon which to construct either a counter insurgency or poverty reduction strategy!

Against this background the requirement to bring together all par-





The creation at JWC Stavanger of a **“White Cell”** for pre-deployment training for Afghanistan HQ ISAF staff attempts to **enhance the internal ISAF processes** which are exercised by contributing to a **more holistic and realistic understanding of the mission ahead.**

ties who will share the same operating environment is clear. NATO Joint Warfare Centre training exercises provide that opportunity and do so in a way that allows even humanitarian organizations to participate without compromising their principles or affecting their security. This goes some way to encouraging a mutual exchange of information, establishing working contacts and relationships, aiding understanding of respective policies and, most importantly, exposing those not familiar with the country to the critical need for cultural sensitivity and knowledge of their surroundings.

The creation at JWC Stavanger of a “White Cell” for pre-deployment training for Afghanistan HQ ISAF staff attempts to enhance the internal ISAF processes, which are exercised by contributing to a more holistic and realistic understanding of the mission ahead. This is partly achieved by populating the Cell with Afghan experts, representatives from key organizations in theatre, international actors working on critical issues in the country, and other civilians who have more generic experience on Afghanistan from work in the NGO community and donor organisations. And any en-

gagement between civilian bodies (GiRoA, civil society, donors, NGOs and internationally mandated bodies such as the UN) and the military cannot be confined to C-J9 or the CIMIC cell. All branches must be aware of the context in which they operate and how their actions and decisions impact upon the lives of ordinary Afghans. A “stove piped” approach to civilians will not work. This too is exercised in Stavanger.

WHITE CELL COMPOSITION

As an example of the richness of experience which the White Cell represents, the training exercise for ISAF HQ in December 2008 had a membership of nine with varied backgrounds and differing views. It should be noted that the White Cell is not a homogenous body – there are lots

of views and opinions and what one member of the Cell may say may be opposed by others. Sometimes individuals are bound to represent the policies of their parent organizations, which as individuals they may not wholeheartedly support. This is not unusual and probably more truly reflects the reality in theatre where the international assistance community frequently demonstrates a lack of consensus and a resistance by any one organization to be coordinated by another – even a mission endorsed by the Security Council (e.g. in Afghanistan UNAMA) or mandated by the UN to coordinate humanitarian assistance (e.g. UNOCHA)

WHITE CELL PARTICIPANTS

The December 2008 White Cell Afghan experts have seen their country suffer succeeding coups and civil wars over the last 30 years alone. And whilst their expertise is in cultural awareness training at all levels for military personnel, they have personal knowledge of the depth of



the trauma suffered by the Afghan people and their hopes and fears, perceptions and survival techniques – many of which will have an impact on both military actors and the assistance community's efforts to provide support.


The UN was represented in the exercise by the UNAMA Civil Military Coordination Officer and the Field Security Co-ordination Officer from the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).

The UNAMA representative is the advisor to the Humanitarian Coordinator and Deputy SRSG

whose role is to help facilitate coordination between the military and civilians on humanitarian, disaster support and other issues. Now a civilian, he previously served in the military but then decided to use his experience to work on humanitarian and disaster relief operations in post conflict situations in such countries as Cambodia, Northern Iraq, East Timor, Kosovo, Mozambique and Sierra Leone.

The UNDSS representative works in the Security Information Operations Centre analysing events, such as intimidation, assassination, abduction and crime, which have an impact on the delivery of assistance to vulnerable populations and on security as perceived (and often experienced) at the local level. This analysis is shared and compared with ISAF to produce a more comprehensive picture of security and its patterns or trends across the country. An ex-policeman, the UNDSS representative also has a different, but in the Afghan context, complementary view of security than that of the military. His policeman's view has also been enhanced by his

experience working for UNHCR both in Sierra Leone and Tanzania on



staff and refugee security.

To address key issues over the coming months the White Cell expertise covered the forthcoming elections in Afghanistan and the challenges of addressing opium production. On the former, another soldier working in a civilian capacity but with experience of a tour at Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) in 2005 dealing with election security and working with the Afghan Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) programme is now seconded through his military to UNDP, and by extension, to the Independent Election Commission (IEC) as its security advisor – a critical role in the months ahead. On the latter, a member of the UK Embassy's Counter Narcotics Unit was present and able to brief on the current situation regarding opium production, trafficking routes and the impact of the trade on good governance and security.

Three members of the team had a more general background but still informed by having worked in the country as well as considerable experience of working in many fragile and volatile environments. This experience en-

compassed evolving NGO atti-

tudes to the military; issues, activities, strategies related to stabilisation including good governance, sustainable development and the need for tangible evidence of progress; and strategic communication and messaging in the regional context.

The benefits of the White Cell are not however all one sided. Those civilians who attend have an opportunity to make contact with their military counterparts and have a platform not usually accorded them to highlight issues of real concern. More informally, they can also express views or suggest improvements to civil-military working practices that may in the past (and even still) have impeded progress or created negative perceptions of ISAF in any number of areas. By discussion, even argument the real challenges of working together can be rendered less debilitating by recognising the value of each contribution.

CHALLENGES

There are still challenges for both White Cell participants and JWC training staff to overcome. The release of civilians from their parent organizations is both difficult and unpredictable especially for the full



period of the exercise. Ideally, there should be a win-win outcome to this kind of training and this needs to be demonstrated to providing agencies. Some directors face a tough decision on whether to allow an individual, often a key member of staff, to attend JWC events because of their current workload. There is a cost benefit argument to be had and JWC could assist in positively swaying a civilian director's decision by providing educational material highlighting the benefits of participation to all parties.

Access to classified material is still causing problems and probably creates just as much frustration for the Training Audience as it does for the White Cell. It is particularly galling when information provided by the civilian community is fed into the military system and then not releasable to those same civilians because of its security classification. Whilst everyone appreciates the need for operational security and there will always be sensitivity in handling any information related to it, most of the exchanges both in theatre and during the exercise will relate to issues of general security, support to the population

and issues of governance. Not to share only leads to a sense of resentment and a withholding of information which may be of genuine value. Again, this has been recognised institutionally but all too often whether to share or not is down to an individual's judgement. Feedback, an important component of any training cycle, has to be more consistently and immediately fed back to the Training Audience. Given all the pressure imposed and the tight schedule this is not as easy as it sounds but an opportunity to comment, along with all the other exercise players would capitalise on what went well, clarify misunderstandings and highlight issues that should be avoided in theatre.

WHITE CELL EVOLUTION

Training for ISAF HQ deployments and the specific contribution of the White Cell is evolving and has come a long way since its inception. Key leader side bar briefings are an innovation, which appear to have worked well but would benefit from being expanded to include the whole training audience – particularly on cultural awareness. Governance, an issue of critical importance to economic, so-

cial and political development, was barely mentioned two years ago. Today, at least everyone is aware or made aware of its significance.

WHITE CELL STAFF

A word of thanks to the embattled White Cell staff who not only have to deal with, sometimes, rebellious White Cell participants but are in the unenviable position of being intermediaries and having to explain military decisions, processes, acronyms and the logic of the battle rhythm (an alien concept to most civilians) to the White Cell. They are supportive throughout and have managed to keep both sides on side despite the inevitable hiccup.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, the White Cell concept and the efforts made by JWC Stavanger to broaden the training and reality of the exercise is welcome. Such an orientation must be increased and valued before and during any deployment. When properly utilized this approach using the right tools shapes understanding on how to achieve a possible outcome or solve arising problems. Appreciating a people's, in this case, Afghan culture, population and environment is as important as knowing how to use guns, troops and military equipment.



LEFT, BELOW White Cell Print Media team for exercise STEADFAST JAW 2007; White Cell meeting before start of exercise STEADFAST JOIST 09. Photos by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO.



LEFT The picture shows some of the members of the deployed White Cell in Valencia during Phase III of exercise STEADFAST JOINER 2008, where they engaged the LCC (NRDC-SP).

By Hope Carr,
Media Advisor for the Exercise Department of
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre



EXERCISE MEDIA

From left CDR Ola Karlsen, NOR N, JWC Chief White Cell Media; JWC's "World News Today" (WNT).

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA in modern military operations is continually changing. The development of 24-hour news programming, citizen journalists, embedded media, and media cells of extremist groups has allowed media and its role as the purveyor of public opinion and sentiment to become an integral part of modern warfare. Present day militaries must consider and prepare for the impact media will have on all aspects of their ability to achieve their operation mandate. These implications range from political and citizen support for troop deployment in their home countries to local understanding of their roles and mandates in their place of deployment. Commanders, their key staff officers and the Public Affairs staff of a military headquarters will be under constant and intense media scrutiny during operations, both in the theatre of operations and abroad. The ability to have effective and clear communication within the Public Affairs and media environment is a critical aspect of contemporary military operations.

The evolving role of the media (public opinion domain) experienced by modern militaries requires a change in the way in which militaries prepare and train. Media and public opinion are no longer the sole domain of the Public Affairs officers. All elements of an headquarters must consider and engage with the impact the media environment, as purveyor of public opinion and attitudes, has on the success of the operation. Exercise media must push beyond facts and challenge the Training Audience to look at media as it is in the real world - a purveyor of attitudes, beliefs, contexts and effects. Sometimes "perception is reality" and can affect the desired outcomes of operations. Exercise media should provide commanders and their staffs with an opportunity to better understand and experience the impact of media in a "safe" learning environment before encountering them in the reality of the real world.

METHODOLOGY

APPROACH: EXERCISE MEDIA MUST PROVIDE the Training Audience with opportunities to engage the

whole of the headquarters in the media environment. The impact of the media environment must be effectively communicated throughout the headquarters (via the PAO, J2, IO and Commander) and require all branches of an headquarters to consider the implications it has on their part of the operation. The existence of a media cell in exercise is not in place to test the skills of the PAO. It should effectively test the ability of the headquarters to consider, engage and strategize as to how they will manage the media environment and function within this environment. The complexity of the environment should not be the driver for effective exercise media; rather, the ability of the exercise media environment to require the Training Audience to communicate internally, analyze and prioritize media impact and strategize methods, throughout the headquarters, to manage the environment through multiple means should be the driver.

PRESENTATION: ALL ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN REALISM in the means, method and design of media products should take place. Replicating real-world means and the challenges that come with accessing them will result in effective training for the Training Audience. This methodology should be followed in both the medium chosen and the physical presentation of the material. Web should be provided in a replicated news website format, print should be provided in a designed newspaper format that uses images to allow it look and feel like a real newspaper. To ensure methodology of the approach is maintained, it is important that the media provided to the Training Audience is clearly defined by their area of interest (local, national, international) and their biases (based on the developed approach of the media outlet). No story is required to only be addressed from one area of interest; however, it is important that the story changes if the driver is local vs. international.

The goal is to immerse the Training Audience in the media environment and provide the realism required to maintain their attention. The average person provides 5 seconds to capture their attention. We must make the most of that time so they will engage in the media environment that we create.

From Stavanger to Kabul



By Lieutenant Colonel Gerard Lys, FRA AF,
Deputy OPR Planning Team B,
JED, JWC

Photos by Raphael Baekler, DEU AF,
PAO, JWC

A snapshot of ISAF training topics

TWICE a year, the Joint Warfare Centre offers the most robust training contingency to Headquarters International Security Assistance Force (HQ ISAF) staff deploying to Kabul. Our last training event (TE 09/01) was conducted successfully as planned from 1 to 12 December 2008 at the JWC training facility in Ulsnes with a Training Audience of 180, including:

- 109 personnel from the Standing Headquarters of the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps in Italy; and
- 71 Individual Augmentees.

Since the creation of ISAF, NATO's Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum) headquartered in the Netherlands, has developed a number of ISAF pre-deployment training syllabuses together with the Joint Warfare Centre, Norway; Joint Force Training Centre, Poland; and NATO School Oberammer-

gau, Germany. Commander Joint Force Command Brunssum is the Officer Conducting the Exercise for all ISAF training events. A JFC Brunssum-led Initial Planning Conference was held on Friday, 27 June at Ulsnes to set up the consolidate backbone of the training. Following that meeting, a Training Event Planning Team was set up with the support of all divisions of the JWC, as required. Lieutenant Colonel Pedersen, Danish Army, from the Joint Exercise Division, was appointed to lead this Planning Team.

TRAINING AUDIENCE: The Standing Headquarters and the Individual Augmentees arrived on Sunday, 30 November. JWC Real Life Support provided transportation and organized the in-processing as well as the accommodation at the Madla military facilities. The list of designated augmentees, for whom this series of training events is

the best, and consequently their preferred training opportunity, was determined through a thorough analysis of the HQ ISAF Crisis Establishment. As a result, a selection was made including posts across all HQ ISAF branches, which mirrors and complements the Standing Headquarters' fill. Out of 71 Individual Augmentees, 18 were Key Leaders (OF-5 and above). The training was given from 1 to 12 December, from 0800 through 1945 hours everyday.

TRAINING CONTENT: During the ISAF Training Event, the directives and guidance on the training objectives were provided by the Commander JFC Brunssum. As a prerequisite for the training, any Individual Augmentees who had missed out on the initial pre-deployment training were required to read through the on-line Advanced Distributed Learning, which is unclassified mission specific in-



formation about different topics, such as ISAF mission, life in ISAF, Afghanistan's geography, recent history and culture, basic Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Training and Tactics Procedures, role of various NGOs working within Afghanistan. This mission-tailored learning package was provided by Headquarters Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT), in conjunction with JFC Brunssum. The event was a four-day training activity during which the training audience was exposed to Mission Specific Training, in order to develop a common understanding of Afghanistan and ISAF mission related issues, which also included:

- Electronic Working Practices;
- Functional System Training;
- Functional Area Training.

This was followed by two days of Battle Staff Training. The culmination of the event was the five-day Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE). MRE ensures the staff possesses a sound understanding of the ISAF Standard Operation Procedures; FAT; Battle Rhythm; processes; and how to build capable, confident and cohesive staff teams to respond to various situations related to ISAF operations using HQ ISAF Standard Operations Procedures. The content of the training is developed with the support of the Joint Training Development Division.

RUNNING THE TRAINING (EXCON AND TA): To execute the training, an Exercise Control (EXCON) was put in place and manned by 266 personnel (122 from JWC), under the command of



the Officer Directing the Exercise (ODE), the Commander JWC, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, German Army. EXCON was made up of different teams: Communication and Information Systems, Real Life Support, Exercise Center (EXCEN: Situation Centre and Response Cells, e.g., High Control Cell, Air Cell, Low Control Cell and the White Cell); Training Team (mentors, role players, event teams, Subject Matter Experts and analysts).

AFTER ACTION REVIEW: On the last day of the event, JWC ran an After Action Review (AAR), also dubbed as the "hot wash-up", that is conducted to gain maximum training benefit. It was led by

COM JWC, who stated that TE 09/01 was a very successful training event that gave the staff the best training and knowledge to take over their post within the HQ ISAF. Regarding the delivery of the overall training, a range of areas were identified for action to help improve the training model. As a result of the JWC and JC Brunssum lessons learned processes, a number of best practices were achieved in exercise planning and development, providing excellent results. I am glad to note that Joint Warfare Centre personnel are continually increasing their level of ISAF experience, thus directly improving the overall quality of our training events. ✦



LEFT Senior Leaders Discussion, 7 December 2008, Lt. General Korte, COM JWC and BG West, COS JWC with Major General Jason Kamiya, Major General Kjell-Ove Skave and Major General Rokos. **RIGHT** ISAF CJOC at Ulsnes.



IMPROVING AIR/GROUND MISSION REHEARSAL TRAINING FOR ISAF

«We are in the kind of war where an untrained man is a bigger threat to his shipmates than he is to the enemy.»

— General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, All Hands Call, 16 January 2009

By Major James Rowley, US AF,
SO Doctrine, CDD,
Joint Warfare Centre

AIR/GROUND coordination in combat has a long history of challenges. This has been true in the past and it is true in today's operations in Afghanistan. A mission in a landlocked country with little infrastructure,

where daily operations are heavily reliant on air for logistics, security, intelligence and surveillance requires mandatory education and training on how to best understand and integrate air/ground. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to describe



Headquarters ISAF (HQ ISAF) staff training and how the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) has sought to improve air/ground training in support of HQ ISAF's mission.

HQ ISAF MISSION REHEARSAL EXERCISE BACKGROUND:

The JWC has conducted HQ ISAF Mission Rehearsal Exercises since 2004. These training events are conducted twice annually and comprise the final mission rehearsal for staff members headed to Kabul. Their purpose is to train future HQ ISAF core staff and augmentees together, so they can quickly integrate and function as an effective team once in theatre.

In early HQ ISAF training events, air/ground integration was included but primarily as a background event. Air training was limited and scripted air/ground scenarios were not a priority. However, beginning in September 2006, the JWC reviewed several issues regarding air/ground integration and training in support of HQ ISAF. Numerous reports highlighted the need for improvement and included:

- After Action Reviews from JWC ISAF training events;
- The initial analysis and lessons identified report concerning the fratricide incident which occurred on 4 September 2006;
- Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned reports on Air Command and Control and pre-deployment training of the Composite Headquarters model;
- Land Component Commander Heidelberg first impression reports;
- HQ ISAF internal analysis of air-power employment;
- Flag Officer concerns of joint air/ground integration.

All of these reports pointed to the importance of air and land integration, particularly in Afghanistan. Accordingly, there has been a continuous process to improve the quality and currency of training for deploying ISAF staff.

HOW AIR/GROUND MISSION REHEARSAL TRAINING HAS BEEN IMPROVED: Through the efforts of multiple NATO organizations, air/ground

integration has become a focus area in HQ ISAF Mission Rehearsal Exercises. The JWC reviewed the previous reports and examined the current air/ground integration in HQ ISAF. To improve air and land training, the JWC focused in the following training areas: *experience, environment and participation.*

► Experience

The JWC first sought to integrate HQ ISAF experience and Subject Matter Expertise. While there are many air/ground experts, those with current HQ ISAF experience are targeted to mentor during the JWC's training events. Subject Matter Experts, directly from the field in HQ ISAF, work best since they have the highest degree of job knowledge and are up-to-date on current operations. The JWC also seeks air experts who recently returned from ISAF as their past experiences also improve air/ground training. To locate HQ ISAF air experts, the JWC coordinates with HQ ISAF, Allied Air Component Command HQ Ramstein, Joint Force Command Brunssum and United States Joint Force Command.

As always, the JWC provides Observer/Trainers who have been involved in numerous HQ ISAF training events and have operational experience. These Observer/Trainers provide the ability to tie in current instruction with lessons learned from previous exercises. In sum, combining current experts with future staff has improved HQ ISAF air/ground training and will be a continuous focus area in the future.

► Exercise Environment

The script is the backbone of any exercise, but the real-world content of the HQ ISAF training script sets it apart. This script contains real world scenarios that stimulate discussion, decision making and coordination. To ensure currency and accuracy of the script, HQ ISAF air/ground experts are invited to the scripting conference before the start of each bi-annual exercise.

In order to replicate a realistic exercise environment, JWC planners gather real world data directly from HQ ISAF several weeks before the start of the exercise. Actual missions, incidents, requests and chat room conversations are incorporated. Other major themes, such as the forthcoming elections in Afghanistan, are added to help prepare deploying staff for a variety of future events. Just before the exercise, key JWC personnel deploy to HQ ISAF to refine the script and have it approved.

In every JWC exercise, scripts are managed by "Event Managers." These Event Managers are responsible for development of their particular scenarios, and during an exercise, Event Managers direct the sequence and execution of his/her portion of the script. In early HQ ISAF training events, air did not have a specific Event Manager. Since then, the HQ ISAF training team has dedicated a specific Event Manager for air training. This action ensures that scripted air/ground play is properly coordinated. This dedicated Event Manager interacts with air experts to adjust the pace of the script, and, depending on the understanding and performance of the training audience, adds or repeats incidents. This gives the staff a chance to practice the skills required for in HQ ISAF.

Net effect: Future HQ ISAF staff members are able to train in an environment that uses current Information Technology systems, recent real-world scenarios and under the carefully considered pace of a dedicated Event Manager. This addresses air/ground integration and improves the training, and eventual integration of newly assigned HQ ISAF personnel.

► Participation

In close coordination with HQ ISAF and Joint Force Command Brunssum, the JWC now uses a top down approach to maximize training of new HQ ISAF staff members. At the top are HQ ISAF "Senior Mentors." These Senior Mentors are flag-level leaders currently serving on HQ ISAF staff who





“A mission in a landlocked country with little infrastructure, where daily operations are heavily reliant on air for logistics, security, intelligence and surveillance requires mandatory education and training on how to best understand and integrate air/ground.”



join the JWC's bi-annual exercises in order to mentor and lead the inbound staff.

In exercises, these Senior Mentors act as the HQ ISAF commander, or other senior staff members, and provide exercise and training guidance to prepare subordinates for their future duties and HQ expectations. Secondly, “Key Leaders” are invited to attend the bi-annual exercises. Key Leaders are those in the next rotation of senior officers who will fill selected leadership roles within the HQ ISAF staff. Their participation is critical, not only in building their individual familiarity with operational issues and staff processes, but also in their ability to build a sense of team with the members who will comprise their future HQ ISAF directorates.

Just as important as providing the right mix of Senior Mentors and Key Leaders is the maximization of participation by individuals. This requires well-timed coordination of Joint Force Command Brunssum with the next-to-rotate core staff element, as well as with nations that supply individual

augmentees. With each recent exercise, individual participation has grown and enabled more augmentees to report to service in Kabul as a better-prepared member of the staff.

CONCLUSION: To play off SACT's quote, the untrained man is one threat that can be mitigated through

proper training. In concert with ACO and ACT commands, the JWC continually refines its training to ensure future HQ ISAF staff members are best prepared to carry out their responsibilities. By continuing to work the right combination of experience, environment and participation, JWC training will remain relevant for HQ ISAF. ✈



A-10 flight-over-Afghanistan photo by Sgt Aaron Allmon, US AF.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH CAUCASUS: OSCE Election Observation Mission to the Azerbaijani Presidential Election

By Bente Heill Kleven, Linguist, JWC PAO

BACKGROUND: Following an invitation from Azerbaijan's Government, the OSCE (Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) early September 2008 deployed a mission to observe the 15 October presidential election in Azerbaijan. The mission was a joint undertaking of OSCE/ODIHR, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament (EP). Its terms of reference were to assess the entire election process in terms of its compliance with OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. To achieve this, observers monitored the election campaign and media coverage and assessed voting throughout the country.

HANNE Eik from Stavanger volunteered to be part of the Election Observation Mission. As a Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration, she has almost 30 years of experience with the civil service and made the election administration arrangements for the 90,000 voters living in Stavanger during the last elections there. She had long wanted to contribute to civil society building projects abroad when, in 1996, she joined the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, NORDEM, whose stand-by force currently comprises some 260, all offering expertise on human rights or democratization and available for short-notice assignments with international organisations. NORDEM works primarily with bodies like OSCE, OSCE/ODIHR, EU, EULEX, UN and UNMIK.

"I first became involved as I consecutively served as supervisor, or election conductor, and election officer on five missions for OSCE to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in the late 1990ies. As part of the Dayton Peace Accords, OSCE was at the time called upon to provide support for the democratization processes in BiH, including conduct of elections. Later, in a different function, I observed elections on European Union election missions to Zimbabwe in



2002 and Cambodia in 2008. I then deployed on a seven week mission to Azerbaijan as a long term observer," Hanne Eik explained, adding: "The reasons why I took on this last mission are many: perform and learn a kind of election work I never did before; live and work together with people from many different countries; participate in the democratization of a former USSR republic; get to know a new country and its people".

As for the profile of an election observer, she is firm in her determination that "You basically need to be interested in topics such as civil society development, human rights and democratization. Knowledge of election administration is clearly a plus while fair knowledge of oral and written English is a must. However, as I see it, individual qualities are just as important: ability and willingness to work with colleagues with a background different from your own; a mind open

to the culture and people of your host country. Also, a certain practical turn of mind is very helpful as are politeness and respect for your local partners."

Talking about her duties, Hanne Eik explained that her main task was to observe the election preparations and the electoral campaign prior to the polling day. The Constitution, the Election Code and various instructions provided the legal framework for the observation. 14 teams were each assigned a specific portion of the country to observe.

"My partner and I covered the 'Baku East' area, i.e. 13 constituencies, each with its own election commission. Prior to the polling day, we held several meetings with all commissions in order to obtain information on the status of the election preparations. Similarly, we met with local authority officials and also saw members of polling station commissions and representatives of local political organizations, including those of the opposition, as well as media, human rights organizations, and voters. All relevant findings were consolidated into a weekly report for the Election Observation Mission headquarters in Baku. On election day, our responsibility was to ensure that our teams were able to conduct their observation as planned."

"To sum up, a long-term election observer on deployment has to be a fast learner on topics such as electoral processes and social structures. Our local assistant had the knowhow to support us brilliantly and provided an outstanding insight into Azerbaijani history, social conditions, institutions and government, which turned out be a great plus in our relations with local partners. I would certainly be happy to go back if I had the chance."

"I welcome reports from the international election observers from OSCE, Council of Europe and the European Parliament indicating progress in the conduct of Azerbaijan's presidential elections on 15 October 2008. Azerbaijan should build on this achievement and address the remaining shortcomings that were noted. Azerbaijan is a long-standing and valuable Partner of the Alliance and we look forward to continuing and strengthening our dialogue and practical cooperation, and our support to reforms".

NATO Secretary General, Press Release of 17 October 2008.



“Afghans are dedicated to developing their own vision of a stable, prosperous and legitimate Afghanistan.”

**Ayscha Hamdani, Political Advisor to NATO
Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan**



*In this interview, **Ayscha Hamdani** examines development of governance and democracy in run-up to Afghan Presidential and Provincial Council elections. By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO*

Q. Could you tell us briefly about yourself and your tasks as the Political Advisor?

A. My name is Ayscha Hamdani. I have been working in Afghanistan in various areas for almost six years now and joined the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) Office just over six months ago.

As part of the political team, I focus primarily on Afghan domestic politics as well as regional dynamics and cooperation (at the moment primarily Pakistan and Iran). On a regular basis I, therefore, engage with the Afghan political scene (Ministries, Parliament etc.) and the international community, in particular, Embassies.




Photo by Dana Ward



“Coming from abroad, we have a tendency to see Afghanistan as a project and often fail to see that despite years of conflict and destruction, there is beauty here that should not be disregarded.”



Within the ongoing Security Sector Reform, I closely follow the development of the Afghan National Police and, in conjunction, monitor the Rule of Law/Justice Sector.

Having developed a significant subject matter expertise on Afghanistan during the past years, I further provide advice on “good governance” developments, especially regarding traditional and tribal structures in Afghanistan, with particular focus on the Southern regions.

Being of Afghan origin gives me a unique insight into Afghanistan's political and social scene, which proves to be an invaluable asset to our daily work.

Q. What are the specific issues that you will be focusing on in the coming months?

A. The Senior Civilian Representative's role in Afghanistan is to carry forward the Alliance's political-military objectives in Afghanistan; liaising with the Afghan Government, civil society, representatives of the international community and neighboring countries. We therefore follow developments, amongst others, in the area of Security Sector Reform (Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police), good governance, rule of law, regional cooperation and PRT efforts. Currently, we have two teams. One team focuses on political developments and political-military cooperation, and the second one on PRT harmonization and civil-military cooperation.

For the coming months, I will primarily focus on the upcoming Presidential elections, which are to take place on the 20th of August, and how these will shape and affect the political dynamic in Afghanistan. I already had the chance to follow and observe the last elections in 2004/5, and it is fascinating to see how the understanding of this political process has grown in Afghanistan since.

At the turn of the year, a new Minister of Interior was appointed to Afghanistan. One of Minister Atmar's first undertakings in his new role was to put forward a set of much needed priorities for the reform of the Afghan National Police (ANP). He presented these, amongst others to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Since then there has been much talk of expanding the current size of the ANP, providing more focused and adequate training and



revising the current National Police Plan. Within these current efforts to “revamp” the police sector, especially in view of the upcoming elections, for which a secure environment has to be ensured, I closely follow all developments to provide comprehensive updates that will allow NATO to define its way ahead in the provision of increased support to ANP reform in the future.

A third focus of mine is the political climate in Pakistan and how it affects Afghanistan. Initiatives for dialogue and cooperation with the aim of finding a comprehensive approach to the region in order to fight terrorism and bring the two nations together have increased since the appointment of the current Pakistani president. However, recent events within Pakistan have demanded a change in focus and cooperation efforts are now competing with other priorities. Nonetheless, I follow all initiatives that take place, be they on a bilateral, trilateral or multilateral level in order to formalize an understanding of what regional cooperation could develop to be in the future, and as it was set out as one of the priorities in the Paris Conference on Afghanistan that took place in 2008.

Q. In the face of upcoming elections, how do you gauge the public mood in Afghanistan?

A. Elections are part of what constitutes a democratic process in any country. The 2009/10 elections are the second ones since the international community came to Afghanistan in 2001. Since the first elections in 2004/5, which I was able to observe, the political mindset of the Afghan population has grown substantially. The main change to the last time round is that this time the process is Afghan led. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has been established to see Afghanistan through a process of free, fair and credible elections. This is a huge step for Afghanistan; its government and its people in defining their own future.

However, there are many, who criticize the process, calling it flawed, corrupt and nowhere near perfect.

Elections



An Afghan woman puts her parliament ballot in the box mark for parliament votes on September 18, 2005 during Afghanistan's first parliamentary elections. US Army photo by Sgt Reynold.

True – it may not be perfect and we may still be at a stage of “try, fail, and try again” but it should not be forgotten that it is a process of trial and error that enables an electoral process to improve and manifest itself within a society. The fact of the matter is that the Afghan people want elections to take place and it is elections that will re-invigorate the political process in Afghanistan.

I think we are on the right track. I am very happy to observe that there has been a learning process since the last time elections took place and that there is a growing understanding amongst both the political actors and the population as to why elections are important and necessary. This is well reflected in the recent voter registration process, where about one million voters more than expected were registered without any major incidents. The election debate is picking up all over the country at the speed of light and everyone has an opinion. With an engaged and much more critical public, potential candidates have to give their best in their campaigning efforts. This may only be one event in the development of Afghanistan towards defining its future but it is an important one and therefore deserves all the support it can get.

Q. Afghanistan has a long history of traditional and tribal structures. Many Afghans today view life through tribal perspective. How difficult is it to bring modern system of democracy here?

A. You know, I think I could write a whole book to answer this question but let me try to explain. Afghanistan is very complex. Not only has it been torn apart by war and various regimes pursuing different ideologies, but throughout the centuries, society has been shaped and influenced by three main factors: tradition, religion and state. Whereas tradition and religion have largely merged into a unique “Afghan way”, the state system has been weak and never managed to take root in the whole of the country. There were several efforts in the past to make the state system dominate all other systems but these failed, partially because Afghan society has a tendency to put more trust into its familiar, customary systems and regresses towards the latter in the absence of good governance structures. Since state reform efforts started in 2001, there has been a strong focus on building and strengthening official state structures throughout the country. Unfortunately, until very recently, little thought seems to have been put



into putting in place mechanisms of transition that would allow society to move towards and embrace modern state structures. Furthermore, ongoing conflict and the insurgency in Afghanistan have provided space for additional local power structures (warlords, narcolords, Taliban etc.) to evolve, which adds to the disruption of efforts to establish a single democratic system in Afghanistan. As you can see, this is a rather complex subject. When addressing the topic of democracy in Afghanistan, we need to remember that traditional structures and mechanisms present in Afghanistan until this day are democratic in nature, but do not necessarily constitute a Western understanding of democracy. Establishing a democratic system in any country is a very long and tedious process. Democracy cannot be imported or be "put" onto a society. It has to grow from within and will require decades to manifest itself within a state and a system. Given that Afghanistan's traditional system (and remember that it is a combination of custom and religion) already carries democratic notions and that the Afghan Constitution is founded on democratic values, I think Afghanistan has the right recipe to define its own approach to democracy. It will take a lot of time and much effort to bring together tradition, religion and state, but Afghans are dedicated to developing their own vision of a stable, prosperous and legitimate Afghanistan.

“The various actors, including the military have now agreed to what is called the Comprehensive Integrated Approach, whereby security, development and governance efforts are even further coordinated and focused on specific parts of the country.”

Q. In order to expand the reach of government in Afghanistan, President Karzai created the Independent Directorate of Local Governance in 2007. It is all about good governance and capacity building. How important is their contribution?

A. Here we can move on to an example I like to use when showing how Afghanistan is defining its own approach to democracy. As I mentioned before, the state has always faced major challenges in extending governance efforts to the country, but with the exception of suc-

cessful projects such as the National Solidarity Program, so far little attention has been paid to put in place transitional mechanisms to integrate a traditional value systems into the modern state mentality.

The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) was established with the aim of allowing for the state to reach out to its population even at the grassroots level. In conjunction, Parliament is currently reviewing the Sub-national Governance Policy for Afghanistan. Whereas this may not be the first attempt to involve the people, it certainly seems to be a lasting one.

One of the primary functions of the IDLG is to establish community councils under what is called the Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP). These councils allow the community to take part in the political process through elected representatives. Whereas the actual mechanism by which the council is established still falls within a very traditional framework, the process as a whole is nonetheless happening under the auspices of the government. ASOP can therefore be considered a transitional mechanism from traditional structures towards modern state structures. It needs to be said that so far the response from the population has been very positive, and community councils are even being used as mechanisms of conflict resolution in the absence of law enforcement and judicial institutions, which are still be-

Afghan National Police



Providing support to the Afghan National Police (ANP) is one of ISAF's key supporting tasks.

From left: Afghan National Police maintaining security, US Marine Corps photo by Cpl.Thibodeau; an Afghan policeman brandishes his certificate, having successfully completed the ANP Training Programme photo by NATO; Czech PRT Logan training ANP photo by Czech Army Capt. Introvicova; ANP patrol through a village US Army photo by Cpl. Guiliano.

“...COIN strategy calls for reconnecting the government to the people; a process requiring not just improved security, but the development of good governance structures.”

ing developed. Eventually, the plan is to transition towards a more formalized Sub-National Governance policy. The IDLG as an institution is still in its infant steps and frequently met by heavy criticism. Is it meeting the expectations? If you listen to the critics – at the moment probably not. However, it is an Afghan concept and yet another step in Afghanistan defining its own way ahead. The initiative may have been off to a rocky start, but as I said before, one needs to remember that it takes decades for efficient and self-sustaining state structures to manifest in any country.

Q. Are we focusing too much on the enemy and not enough on providing the basic services that the Afghan people need?

A. This is a question that you can ask in the context of any post conflict or insurgency ridden country. To tackle it, both the Afghan and international community came together in the Bonn Conference in 2001. That began a process that ultimately led to the final approval of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) in 2008; a strategy that provides a comprehensive approach to extending development efforts across Afghanistan. In addition, the various actors, including the military have now agreed to what is called the Comprehensive Integrated Approach, whereby security, development and

governance efforts are even further coordinated and focused on specific parts of the country. Having been in Afghanistan for almost six years now, I have to tell you that I have never seen this level of cooperation and coordination before and consider it a very positive development.

Now it is true that Afghanistan is facing a persistent insurgency, and that significant efforts are being devoted to fighting it, but this does not mean that the development of the country itself has been put on hold. Indeed, COIN strategy calls for re-connecting the government to the people; a process requiring not just improved security, but the development of good governance structures, and Afghan owned institutions that can deliver services to the people.

The approach is actually threefold: Security, Governance and Reconstruction & Development go hand in hand, both on the military and civilian side. There is growing recognition that Afghanistan cannot be won by military means alone, and that defeating the insurgency will not solve all of Afghanistan's problems at once. What is needed is a political solution, combined with the establishment of good governance structures and reconstruction efforts to bring long term peace and prosperity to the country. As you can imagine, this will require a long term commitment to Afghanistan by all parties involved.

Q. In Afghanistan currently more than 9000 PRT projects are ongoing in various sectors, such as agriculture, health, rural development, education, etc. The number seems to be impressive, but is it enough?

A. There are currently 26 PRTs in Afghanistan, which allow for a countrywide presence, with the exception of the provinces of Dai Kundi and Nimroz. We should remember that PRTs are an interim solution to enable, in a progressive fashion, Afghan authorities to exert fully their governance responsibilities at the sub-national level. Therefore, I don't think we should be asking our-

selves whether over 9000 projects are enough or not, but rather how PRTs can be put to their best use in a comprehensive manner.

Part of the SCR mandate is to facilitate unity and harmonization of effort by PRTs, particularly civilian efforts, with a view to generating greater coherence with Afghan provincial and national level priorities, in support to the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and in coordination with UNAMA, PRTs, and ISAF. This has been a rather big undertaking so far, as it should be noted that there is no “one-fits-all” PRT model since PRTs are run by 14 different countries, with different ways of doing business, and are required to mirror civil-military ratio and activities to the specific local dynamics affecting any given PRT Area of Operation.

Furthermore, only the military component of PRTs falls within the NATO/ISAF chain of command. The civilian part of PRTs remains a national asset. Our team is continuously working to facilitate harmonization of PRT efforts under the framework of the ANDS and the Comprehensive Integrated Approach. It is doing this in close cooperation with all of the above mentioned actors. It is important to remember that the PRTs' ultimate aim is to empower Afghans, not to create a parallel governance structure to run Afghanistan on its own behalf.

Q. What do you believe are the key achievements of NATO?

A. As you know, NATO's main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, fostering improved security, which paves the way for reconstruction and effective governance. It does this predominately through the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Since NATO assumed leadership of ISAF in August 2003, ISAF's main focus has been to support the Afghan National Army (ANA) and now increasingly the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANA



can be considered one of the key achievements so far. With continuous and dedicated mentoring, training and the provision of equipment, the ANA has become an institution that is increasingly capable of protecting Afghanistan's national interests, and is a source of great national pride. Another key achievement is the PRTs. It is true that there is room for improvement as I mentioned before, but it cannot be disregarded that PRTs make a significant contribution to development in Afghanistan as a whole. Close to 20 percent of all international reconstruction and development funding flows through PRTs. Since NATO assumed command of ISAF in 2003, ISAF now has a presence throughout the country, not just in Kabul. Lastly, I also consider the establishment of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative's office in Kabul a key achievement. Communication and coordination are key to moving forward in the context of Afghanistan. With a NATO presence "on the ground", we are now able to better coordinate and carry forward NATO's political-military objectives in Afghanistan.

Q. How would you describe Afghanistan and the true essence of their culture?

A. Let me tell you a story... I remember my first trip to Kandahar – in the South of Afghanistan at the beginning of 2003, when it was not considered "off limits" quite yet. Coming from Europe recently, I had little or no idea what to expect. Arriving at the airport, my local contact must have forgotten me so I found myself stranded in the middle of nowhere. At the time, there was no Kandahar Airbase or KAF, as it is known to most.

After waiting for quite some time (in Afghan terms that means almost an hour), I decided to make my way to the city. Kandahar city, where I was to visit a project, is at least 30 minutes drive from the airport. There were no taxis at the airport, but as I was looking down the long, narrow road, I saw a minibus approaching.

It stopped in front of me and the door opened to at least ten bearded men wearing turbans. After I had explained my situation, I was invited to ride along to the city centre and accepted reluctantly, not knowing whether this was such a good idea. By the time we reached Kandahar, we had discussed all the problems of Afghanistan at least twice, and my new found friends tried to help me locate my contact. As he was nowhere to be found (he must have left for the airport in the meantime), my minibus took me to a variety of places where I could spend the night. Not an easy undertaking in a city like Kandahar, especially for a woman. Finally, we found a hotel, formerly known as the Green Oasis (a name Kandahar once held proudly), where the owners had just returned from abroad with some of their families. They had not yet reopened the hotel, but after hearing my story, I was taken in for the night and given my own wing of the hotel. My minibus companions bid me farewell and asked me if they should take me back to the airport once my work was completed.

They never charged me for the ride, those bearded men with turbans... What followed were three days of "living the green oasis". My hosts provided me with everything I needed, including a big barbecue to welcome me to Kandahar. At one point in the evening, my actual host managed to turn up and we went to visit the projects at Kandahar University I had intended to see the next day. I left Kandahar after three days, and carry the memory of my hosts' hospitality with me in my heart until today.

So, this is how I would describe Afghanistan and the true essence of its culture. A unique place filled with history, culture and tradition and a people who hold the wellbeing of their guests as their utmost virtue. Coming from abroad, we have a tendency to see Afghanistan as a project – as a mission – and often fail to see that despite years of conflict and destruction, there is beauty here that should not be disregarded. ✦



ABOVE An Afghan girl US Army photo by Ssgt Klika; beautiful view from Afghanistan provided by Ayscha Hamdani; Chief of Defence of Afghanistan General Bismallah Khan shaking hands with NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 11 March 2009. Photo by NATO.

Ayscha HAMDANI
Email: ayscha.hamdani1@hq.isaf.nato.int

NATO

turns **60**



ON 4 APRIL 1949, foreign ministers from 12 nations and 1,500 invited guests gathered in Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. The NATO Alliance was formed to unite efforts for collective defence and preserve peace and security. For half a century, providing collective defence for all member states, NATO was the bulwark of freedom and democracy in Europe and North America. It has been the guarantor of peace in Europe; it has prevented the eruption

of a major conflict between two opposing blocs during the Cold War, and it has transformed itself to become a magnet for all the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO remains today a unique and invaluable Defence Alliance. On 4 April 2009, NATO marked its 60th anniversary with a ceremony during the NATO Summit in Strasbourg, France and Kehl, Germany. The meetings were chaired by NATO Secretary General Jaap de

Hoop Scheffer. They were hosted by the President of the French Republic, Mr Nicolas Sarkozy, and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mrs Angela Merkel.

NATO Summit meetings are not regular meetings, but rather important junctures in the Alliance's decision-making process. Summits have been used to introduce new policy, invite new members into the Alliance, launch major new initiatives and build partnerships with non-





NATO's major contributions to peace and security

- The peaceful end of the great power conflict on and division of the European continent;
- The building of a permanent transatlantic community of values and interests;
- The political and economic recovery of Europe after 1945;
- The ever more developed integration and coordination of US, Canadian and European military forces and capabilities;
- The peaceful ending of the Cold War, the fostering of the unification of Germany, overcoming Cold War dividing lines and development of democracy in the former Warsaw Pact countries;
- The integration of and building of partnerships with former adversaries to create a new cooperative European security system;
- The promotion of arms control and disarmament and of a collective approach to security;
- Helping to end the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s and to pave the way for Euro-Atlantic integration of the entire region;
- Reaching out to Europe's neighbours to the East and to the South to promote trust, dialogue and cooperation in security matters.

of the Washington Treaty. From 12 initial members in 1949, the transatlantic family has grown to 28. The presence of Albania and Croatia here today confirms that NATO's door remains open, and is testimony of our commitment to a Europe whole and free."

For NATO Secretary General, this Summit was a time to look back on the past and prepare for the future. The issues NATO tackles and the evolving security environment, with its many new risks and hazards, makes NATO just as relevant to its members in the 21st century as it was to them in the 20th century.

During the Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to a number of new initiatives for Afghanistan, including a significant expansion of the training and support effort for Afghan National Security Forces, enhanced engagement with neighbouring countries and a more integrated approach to working with the International Community and the Afghan Government to implement the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS).

On 4 April, The NATO Heads of State and Government and the NATO Secretary General participated in a ceremony on the Rhine river, honouring the NATO Military Personnel for their service in the operational theatres of the Alliance – more than 70.000 men and women. They observed a minute of silence – in honour of those who have made the ultimate sacrifice by laying down their life in the service of the Alliance. ✦

ABOVE: Tribute to the NATO military personnel for service in operational theatres of the Alliance. Photo by NATO.

ABOVE LEFT: Journalists attending the final Press Conference of the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit. Photo by NATO.

ABOVE RIGHT: Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Youth Forum.

NATO countries. At the beginning of the North Atlantic Council Meeting, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer welcomed the Heads of State and Government of Albania and Croatia at their first NATO Summit as members of the Alliance. He said "I would like to extend a special word of welcome to President Topi, and Prime Minister Berisha of Albania; as well as President Mesic, and Prime Minister Sanader of Croatia. Today, we celebrate the 60th anniversary

AT THEIR SUMMIT MEETING in Strasbourg-Kehl, NATO leaders re-affirmed the principle of indivisibility of Allied security, the commitment to transatlantic solidarity and the common goal of a Europe that is whole and free.

NATO leaders adopted a Declaration on Alliance Security reaffirming the basic values, principles and purposes of the NATO Alliance. They also launched the process to develop a new Strategic Concept, a document that will define NATO's longer-term role in the new security environment of the 21st century.

In a communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, leaders welcomed Albania and Croatia into the Alliance, reaf-

From left: NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer; Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France. Photo by NATO.



Strasbourg – Kehl Summit strengthens Transatlantic Link and looks at NATO's future challenges

NATO, 4 April 2009

firmed NATO's commitment to continue dialogue and cooperation with partner countries and to keep open the door to NATO membership, with the aim of strengthening security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area.



Heads of State and Government have also taken decisions on the modernisation of capabilities, on the Alliance's engagement with other international organisations and countries and on missions and operations.

Leaders reaffirmed the Alliance's support to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognised the value of enhancing cooperation between the two organisations. NATO leaders also recognised the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, welcoming the EU's efforts to strengthen its capabilities to address common security challenges.

They agreed that NATO's transformation in order to ensure the provision of deployable forces prepared to conduct the full range of military operations and missions will strengthen the Alliance's ability to confront 21st century threats.

NATO leaders acknowledged security

in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely tied to Afghanistan's security and stability and declared that the UN-mandated ISAF mission in Afghanistan is NATO's key priority. In a comprehensive approach combining military and civilian resources, NATO remains committed to help the Government of Afghanistan to support Afghanistan's long-term security and stability, together with the international community. Leaders said that strong constructive engagement by countries of the region is also critical and pledged to reinforce cooperation with all Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan. NATO Heads of State and Government reiterated their commitment to the NATO-Russia partnership as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area. They declared that despite the current disagreements, Russia is of particular importance to NATO as a partner and neighbour and that NATO and Russia share common security interests, such as the stabilisation of Afghanistan, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They also agreed that NATO remains committed to using the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for political dialogue on all issues - where we agree and disagree - with a view towards resolving problems and building practical cooperation.

NATO leaders also welcomed the

French decision to fully participate in NATO structures. Finally, Heads of State and Government of the Alliance looked forward to meet in Portugal for the next NATO Summit to approve an updated Strategic Concept. ✦



NATO ALLIES SELECT NEW SECRETARY GENERAL

At the Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl, the 28 NATO Heads of State and Government agreed unanimously to appoint Danish Prime Minister **Anders Fogh Rasmussen** as NATO's next Secretary General.

Mr Fogh Rasmussen will formally take up his duties on **August 1, 2009**, when the term of the current Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, expires after five and a half years at the helm of the Alliance.



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NATO FOOTPRINT TO STAY PUT:

By Jan-Petter Helgesen for [Stavanger Aftenblad](#)
 Translation Bente Heill Kleven, Linguist, JWC PAO

"The Joint Warfare Centre is likely to remain in its current location for as long as the 60-year old Alliance exists."

The following interview was originally published in paper edition of *Stavanger Aftenblad* on Friday, 13 March 2009.

JÅTTÅ: While physically close together today, JWC and the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) will split into different paths when NJHQ relocates to Bodø on 1 August 2009. "Clearly, at this point of time, as NATO is about to mark its 60th anniversary on 4 April, the fact is that there is no reason whatsoever to fear for JWC's further existence in Stavanger," Commander JWC, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, told *Aftenbladet*. He went on to note that NATO has really taken root in Stavanger through the establishment of its European training centre, adding that a new office, training and exercise facility, currently under construction at the Jåttå site, is the largest of its kind ever built within the Defence

Alliance and has a price tag of approximately NOK 600 million. The great size of the new auditorium, for instance, will make it stand out as a giant by Norwegian standards. It can sit 600, which makes it larger than any other conference centre in South-Norway.

NEW BUILDING: The construction of the new facility, undertaken by the Norwegian Defence Estate Agency (NDEA) together with Stavanger-based companies, is proceeding at an excellent pace. The outer shell of the facility structure will be in place by this Summer. The remainder of the work will take place indoors and includes the fitting-out of the interior such as installation of state-of-the-art

communication and IT equipment, an operation which is anticipated to be completed by late Autumn 2010. Then follows a period of testing and adjusting sophisticated new pieces of equipment, after which the facility will open its doors just in time for NATO training events scheduled for spring 2011. "The investment, which is paid for from NATO infrastructure funding, is so heavy that nobody would ever dream of re-siting the Joint Warfare Centre. The question is not timely and neither is it on the agenda of discussions internally within the Defence Alliance," the General went on to say, nevertheless admitting openly that many of the Alliance's 26ⁿ nations (*Editorial: this article was written before accession of Albania and Croatia to NATO*) could well imagine taking over Norway's role as host to JWC. However, this not an issue and is beyond any thinkable horizon.

"I note with regret, though, Norway's decision to relocate the National Joint Headquarters to Reitan near Bodø, which will be this Summer. NATO's collaboration with the Norwegian military in Stavanger has been excellent all these years since NATO first stood up in the area, back in June 1994, through the then HQ North," said Commander JWC.

HOST NATION: Although NJHQ will close in a few months' time, the mere existence of the Joint Warfare Centre will require Norway to provide an extensive range of support services to the Jåttå site after NJHQ has gone.



By hosting NATO's international transformational command, Norway has indeed undertaken to fulfil a large number of host nation obligations towards NATO. "Discussions are currently going on between NATO and Norwegian authorities as to the scope and extent of their future co-operation. At this stage, it is impossible to predict the outcome of those talks," the General commented.

CAMP MADLA: Among the factors being looked at is the use by JWC of Camp Madla during periods of conferences, seminars and courses. Indeed, until today, when this base for military recruit training is empty of soldiers with no recruits around, the opportunity is given to JWC to draw on the camp's facilities to accommodate its training event attendees. The General explained that Madla is an excellent option because many nations find that hotel accommodation in Norway is simply too expensive for them to use. "In terms of hotel arrangements, there is reason for concern," he observed, "as we face a problem of limitation when it comes to pre-booking hotel accommodation in Norway's 'oil capital'. Maximum 300 rooms are not sufficient for JWC, which regularly stages training events including up to 1,000 attendees." That is when Camp Madla comes to the rescue. Many NATO member countries appreciate to be able to use affordable, low-rate military accommodation for their staff



WOLFGANG KORTE

BORN 25 October 1949

POST Lieutenant General, DEU A; Commander Joint Warfare Centre

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE A wealth of international exposure with deployments to KFOR, Kosovo; and ISAF, Afghanistan.

MARITAL STATUS Married, father of two daughters

INTERESTS Sports. Unwavering dedication to the Stavanger-based Viking Football Club and keen spectator at the club's home matches. German favorite is Hamburger Sportverein (HSV).

members when they travel on duty. "As I see it, closing Camp Madla and accommodating NATO's guests in new-built facilities at Camp Vatne is not a good option in the sense that Vatne is too far away from Jåttå. Here, valuable time will be wasted in transporting people to and from Jåttå," COM JWC eagerly stressed.


ULSNES: Until the new building is available to operate, NATO will continue to hold the bulk of its training events at the former naval station Ulsnes on the outskirts of Stavanger,

a solution which is to the satisfaction of the General. "Conditions at Ulsnes are quite special, though, requiring participants to organize substantial portions of their training programme arrangements themselves," he explained, pointing out that this will not be so at Jåttå, where the new facility will be fitted out and adapted so as to offer more flexibilities and options.

BROAD RANGE OF TRAINING: Since its establishment on 23 October 2003, NATO's Stavanger-based transformational command has delivered two events per year to train and prepare personnel deploying to the International ISAF force in Kabul, Afghanistan. Also commanding elements of the NATO Response Force are given training three times a year. In addition, JWC regularly holds events designed to provide training to Iraqi Key Leaders. Iraqi senior military and police officers as well as civil servants have trained in Stavanger two times a year since NATO in 2005 first offered to provide courses in democracy-building to Iraqi officials. The next event, which is number ten in the series, will be held this spring.

A STAFF FROM ACROSS NATO: The Joint Warfare Centre currently employs a permanent staff of 280, which will be reduced to 256. In addition to this number, 20 civilian specialists recruited from out of Norway work at JWC. JWC staff comes from 26 different nations, i.e. all NATO member states except Iceland and Luxembourg. Also Partnership for Peace nations Austria and Sweden are represented. The post of Commander is filled on a rotational basis by the UK and Germany. Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte took over as Commander JWC on 13 July 2007 and is the second holder of this post following Air Marshal Peter Walker.

In Europe, the Joint Warfare Centre holds a leading position within its sphere of operations. It is subordinate to NATO's Allied Command Transformation headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, USA. ✦



UPDATE

Vice Admiral Jan Reksten stepped down from his post as commander of the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) to make way for Lieutenant General Harald Sunde, new Commander NJHQ.

Photos by Raphael Baekler, DEU AF,
PAO JWC

Lieutenant General Harald Sunde takes command of the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters

By Thomas Kjemperud
PAO NJHQ



Norwegian Chief of Defence General Sverre Diesen (left) presided over the Change of Command Ceremony.

On 30 January 2009 at 1130 hrs, trumpets announced the Change of Command ceremony for the Stavanger-based Norwegian National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ). Most NJHQ staff members and representatives from the JWC, including JWC Commander Lieutenant General Korte, had taken up their position on the parade ground, standing in sharp silhouette against a low January sun, as the change of command ceremony was getting ready to kick off. The ceremony was presided over by the Norwegian Chief of Defence General Sverre Diesen. Addressing the parade, the outgoing Commander, NJHQ Vice Admiral Jan Reksten said: "For the Armed Forces, I hope for the

time to come that we shall be able to enhance our defensive capability, side by side with looking well after our people." The Vice-Admiral retires on 1 February, after forty years of service.

He is replaced by Lieutenant General Harald Sunde, who said he looked forward to setting to work in his new role as operational Commander of the Norwegian Armed Forces. He said: "My aim is to carry on all the good work that has been put in to strengthen our operational capability and also to look well after staff in transition to a new headquarters. I thank the Vice Admiral for his long-lasting personal commitment to all men and women deployed as part of operations in and out of Norway."



**Vice Admiral Reksten,
Outgoing Commander
NJHQ**

Vice Admiral Jan Reksten was born in Bergen on 11 January 1949. He joined the Royal Norwegian Navy in 1969, and he is a 1973 graduate of the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy Submarine Branch. He sailed with several different Navy vessels until he got his first commission in 1977 as commanding officer of the submarine HNoMS SKOLPEN. He ended his initial submarine career as instructor

for the submarine CO qualifying course. From 1981 to 1982, he served as XO at the frigate HNoMS Bergen. From 1982 to 1984 he was assigned to the staff at Defence Command North in Bodø. From 1984 to 1987, he served as a submarine exercise-planning staff officer at CINCEASTLANT/COMSUB EASTLAND in Northwood, UK. After completing National Staff College in 1988, he commanded the frigate HNoMS Narvik for two years. In 1990, as Captain, he commanded the Royal Navy Tactics School at HNoMS Tordenskjold in Bergen. After completing the National Defence College in 1994, he took command as Captain Submarines. From 1994 until 1997, as Commodore, he served as Chief of Staff/Defence Command North Norway. He then served as Commander of the National Joint Staff College from 1997 to 2000. As Rear Admiral, he served as Commander Naval Forces South Norway in Stavanger from April 2000 until June 2002, then as Head of Joint Staff, Defence Command Norway in Oslo. In 2003, he served as Director General Operations department MOD Norway. He was promoted Vice Admiral and took over command of NJHQ on 1 September 2005.


Admiral Reksten is married to Herlaug and they live in Stavanger. They have three grown up children.

Lieutenant General Harald Sunde was born 9 March 1954 in Hurdal, Norway. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1979. Sunde completed the Norwegian Army Staff College I in 1986 and was a student at "Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr" from 1987 to 1989. He is also a graduate from the US Army War College from 1999.

Harald Sunde started his military career as a platoon officer. Sunde was

promoted to Lieutenant in 1976 and to Captain in 1983. Following the graduation from the Military Academy, he served as an officer with the Cavalry School and Training Centre and then as an officer with the Army Special Forces, before he became Deputy Commanding Officer and Commanding Officer, Recce Sqdr/Bde North. He was promoted to Major in 1987. In 1987, he was assigned as an instructor at the Army Staff College followed by a promotion to Lieutenant Colonel in 1992 when appointed Commanding Officer, Army Special Operations Commando. In 1996, he gained experience from an international operation, serving as Chief of Staff, NORPOL BDE/IFOR. In 1996, he also become Commanding Officer, Armoured Brigade South Norway and was promoted to Colonel. Following his term at the US Army War College he became Chief, Operations Planning Branch/Operations Division/HQ DEFCONOR. He was promoted to Brigadier General in 2000 and assigned Inspector of Cavalry/Commander, Cavalry Regiment South. In 2002, Sunde was assigned to a position in NATO Command Structure as ACOS J5/9 at RHQ AFNORTH. In 2003 he was promoted to Major General and assigned Commander Land Forces Norway, followed by the position as Head of Department of Operations and Emergency Planning at the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence from 1 August 2005. On 15 November 2006 he was promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned as the Norwegian Military Representative to NATO Military Committee, Brussels, until 1 November 2008. He was then appointed as Project Director for establishing the new operational headquarters at Reitan. He took over his present command on 1 February 2009.

Harald Sunde is married to Sølvi, and they have two grown up children.



**Lieutenant General Sunde,
Incoming Commander
NJHQ**



LEFT Outgoing Commander NHJQ Vice Admiral Reksten saluting Norwegian Chief of Defence.



Norway's New National Joint Headquarters

By Major General Roar Sundseth,
Royal Norwegian Army,
Chief of Staff, NJHQ



THE Parliament has decided to close Norway's two existing joint operational headquarters – the Jåttå-based *National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ)*, and its subordinate *Regional Headquarters North Norway (RHQNN)*, currently sited at Reitan, Bodø – and replace them with ONE single operational headquarters (NJHQ), to be set up at Reitan. This decision must be viewed as a strategic move to meet Norway's strategic challenges. At the same time, it is a move to essentially shorten and simplify the communication and cooperation between the

military operational chain of command and the strategic level authorities in Oslo.

The Parliament also decided that the new NJHQ at Reitan was to stand up as soon as possible in parallel with the closure of NJHQ, Jåttå; and RHQNN, Reitan. This will require the single NJHQ to be operational at Reitan from 1 August 2009.

Norwegian land and sea territories are consisting of, or bordering territories that constitute big strategic energy and seafood resources. This is a fact that cannot be ignored. These resources are obvious and are



The establishment of the new Norwegian military operational headquarters at Reitan near Bodø is progressing according to schedule, and the HQ will be operational from **1 August 2009**.

noticeably also about to become a strategic focus of all actors that may have an interest in the Arctic.

There is a common understanding that a national military headquarters' geographical location forms a perception of how external and internal actors perceive the national focus. So, from a national strategic perspective, the Reitan site on the outskirts of Bodø, just 100 km or so north of the polar circle, is a highly logical location for a new headquarters. The establishment of a new headquarters at this level is an exceedingly complicated process that requires thorough and careful coordination, and further, an establishment under such tight time schedules does also require the project to be followed up closely.

A project team directly under COM NJHQ has therefore been stood up. The idea is to minimize the effect of the relocation on the current 24/7 operational activity of the affected headquarters and also to bring the creation of the new single NJHQ under the Commander's direct control. Setting up a new headquarters is a mighty task that carries three key challenges: provision of Infrastructure, CCIS and Manpower.

INFRASTRUCTURE: The current headquarters at Reitan (RHQNN) does not meet the new headquarters' infrastructure requirements. Indeed, the infrastructure needs to be adjusted and improved to ensure that the requirements of the new headquarters are met. Building the infrastructure of a new headquarters is time consuming. This case is no exception. It will for instance not be possible to provide all Reitan staff members with workstations until late in 2010. As a result, for an interim period of approximately one year, some one third of the NJHQ staff will physically be working in the old NJHQ's offices at Jåtta. They will relocate to Reitan once the new headquarters' infrastructure is completed and in operation, which is anticipated to happen late 2010.

CCIS: The new headquarters will have a CCIS infrastructure that meets the requirements of a modern military operational headquarters at this level, within resources restrictions that set clear, but realistic limitations. The provision of CCIS needs to be carefully coordinated with that of the other constructions and infrastructure. A lack of coordination in this respect could have a consider-



ABOVE The Defence Minister, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen visited Exercise Cold Response 09. She represents the political aspect of the Norwegian Armed Forces and is responsible for shaping, running and controlling Norwegian security and defence policy. Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold.

ably adverse effect on the progress of the project. Also, building all kinds of infrastructure must be carefully coordinated with the national security requirements set for a military operational headquarters.

MANPOWER: Manning the new NJHQ basically implies that the current staff of the two existing headquarters will make up the bulk of the new HQ staff. It is essential to preserve and pass on the wealth of knowledge and experience held by the two current commands, and also to be able to benefit from the professional knowledge and experience of their current staff. As a result, a major amount of people and for some, also their families, will move from Stavanger to Bodø. This is not necessarily compatible with family needs and



perspectives and some will have to face tough decisions about their future in the military. The fact that this is not an unknown situation for officers and their families does not make the decision any easier for those involved. Despite this challenge, NJHQ is expected to be fully manned and operational by 1 August 2009.

CLOSURE OF NJHQ, JÅTTÅ AND RHQNN, REITAN: These two headquarters will shut down as the new HQ stands up at Reitan. In connection with the setting up of NJHQ, most of the current headquarters' site in Bodø will undergo major renovations, whilst the headquarters in Stavanger will shut down as soon as possible and not later than the end of 2012.

CONCLUSION: The establishment of the new Norwegian military operational headquarters at Reitan near Bodø is progressing according to schedule, and the HQ will be operational from 1 August 2009. What may look like a makeshift solution, at least until late 2010, will have no immediate impact on the headquarters' ability to address the tasks and challenges ahead. The creation of this headquarters reveals Norway's shift in focus over future national challenges in relation to its unique geopolitical location and will be part of an increased focus on Norway's strategic challenges in the future. ✦

RIGHT Exercise Cold Response 09 ran from 16th until 25th March. Around 7,000 soldiers from 14 nations participated to the exercise. The main focus of the land operations took place between Setermoen and Nordkjosbotn in Northern Norway. Photos: A Norwegian soldier by Erik Drabløs; Exercise sign by L. M. Houtun; F16 live shooting range at Setermoen by Torbjorn Kjosvold; Soldier from coastal rangers command by Vegard Grøtt; A team from His Majesty the King's Guard by Erik Drabløs; Light attack boats by Torbjorn Kjosvold; Norwegian Leopard 2 by Peder Aaserud Eikeland; A Norwegian soldier run through forest by Torbjorn Kjosvold; Norwegian F16 at Bodø Air Station by Ove Ronny Haraldsen.

EXERCISE COLD RESPONSE 09



KAIZAN

at the JWC

By CDR Ian Duncan, GBR N,
Chief Maintenance Branch
Joint Warfare Centre

KAIZAN is the Japanese word for continuous improvement and is a philosophy used by many world-leading companies, e.g. Toyota, to describe how they run their business. In simple terms, it means using a process of continual evolution rather than starting from a fresh sheet of paper. Within Support Division the Engineering and Maintenance Branch have adopted this philosophy to improve the site infrastructure to better support the JWC mission. This article will update you on what has recently been achieved and what will be happening in the coming months.

2008 was a busy time in the Engineering and Maintenance Branch (E&M) of Support Division. As well as all of the usual maintenance involved with supporting Jättå and Ulsnes, there were a number of significant defects to rectify and engineering projects to deliver.

Let's look first at Ulsnes and direct support to the Programme of Work. Clearly at the strategic level, the long-term focus is on preparations for moving into and taking over the new building at Jättå. Therefore, we are trying to minimise the work at Ulsnes and focus on the long-term sustainment of the JWC. However, at the tactical level we have undertaken a number of projects to improve the availability and reliability of electrical services and the cooling systems in support of SMC4 and the NCSA computer networks. Supporting the servers is a key issue and many of the historical server crashes were due to excessive heat or loss of electrical supplies. However, many of the past power cuts at Ulsnes were caused by a lack of understanding of the electrical system

leading to individual circuits being overloaded. Therefore, the approach at Ulsnes has focused on a number of areas:

- **Education:** The electrical supply at Ulsnes is old and the electrical demand in a major exercise is high, particularly as many of the buildings are carrying out functions for which they were never designed. However, safety is paramount and modern protection systems have been fitted and electrical drawings developed. There has been considerable work with NCSA and SMC4 in a bottom up initiative that has involved measuring the actual power consumed by electrical equipment and then balancing the circuit loadings of each building. As part of the exercise planning process, SMC4 is now planning the circuit loadings when developing the building plan. It is expected that better education will lead to fewer outages caused by plugging in "just one more PC."

- **Additional Circuits:** Necessary additional electrical circuits have been installed into buildings to provide extra capacity.

- **Spot Cooling and Air Conditioning:** A number of the server and VTC rooms have had additional cooling systems installed. This is not straightforward as it worsens the electrical loading situation.

- **Improved lighting and fire safety:** A number of buildings have been repainted and had their lighting improved. Likewise improvements to signing and emergency lighting have been made to help Ulsnes remain safe.

So, how successful has this been?

In the last 12 months there have been no major power outages at Ulsnes. In particular, the large air conditioning plant fitted to Ulsnes Building 111 over

the 2007/08 Winter to help cool the servers has proven very successful with fewer heat related issues, despite the hot summer.

One of the larger projects undertaken at Ulsnes in 2008 was in response to a JED requirement driven by ISAF. This was to improve the ergonomics of the CJOC to mirror that at ISAF and in effect rotate the Old Gymnasium at Ulsnes by 90 degrees. A plan was developed and executed in conjunction with SMC4 and NCSA. This gives an operational benefit of providing a more realistic training facility for ISAF and the opportunity has been taken to improve the safety of the building by installing a computer floor. This is a raised floor with removable tiles under which cables can be routed. This gives much enhanced flexibility and eases exercise set up whilst at the same time removing trip hazards and provides a more professional facility (computer flooring is widely used in the new building at Jättå). There is deliberately no additional capability provided in this project but there is more redundancy, and the additional electrical circuits should provide greater reliability and resilience. With an eye to the future it is worth noting that the new building at Jättå has recognised these issues in its design and has much redundancy in its cooling and electrical systems. For example, there are three chilled water plants to help cool the server room plus Uninterruptable Power Supplies (UPS) and back up diesel generators. Ulsnes has none of this!

Back at Jättå there has also been a high level of activity. In the Summer we redecorated and altered a number of offices in E-Block. This was in support of the new building and the requirement



for Manpower Branch to vacate their offices, which are now part of the corridor linking E-Block to the new building. Due to the lack of spare offices, this led to a multi-step office shuffle with Support Division being consolidated on Level 1 of E-Block. Additional benefits were obtained as Security moved out of the New Rig enabling JTDD to optimise their layout and the PAO to move into a more suitable space.

Again in support of the new building, E&M renovated the FTD Building garage and turned it into temporary office accommodation for the new building

project support office. This office will be used by JWC and NCSA staff to help drive through the implementation of the new IT systems. Health and Environmental Safety (HES) is always important and E&M have recently completed moving the small Jåttå gymnasium to the basement of the Gausel Magazine. Male and female showers, changing rooms and toilet facilities were all constructed using in house resources. Similarly clothes' drying cabinets have been installed to help encourage staff to cycle/

run to work as well as to be able to take benefit from the gym.

E&M only have responsibility for the NATO buildings and not for the outdoor areas. However, we have been very active in influencing and guiding the Host Nation on HES improvements. In particular, we finally succeeded in getting a non-slip covering for the new rig walkway and have worked hard to get a new pavement outside the Support Elements following the replacement of the water main. We continue to work hard on get-

Old Gymnasium at Ulsnes rotated by 90 degrees to mirror CJOC at ISAF for more realistic training.



Ulsnes

ting satisfactory snow and ice clearance and have had limited success in getting the Host Nation to provide larger car parking spaces and to improve safety in the car park. Looking forward into 2009, I envisage more incremental improvements. In particular at Ulsnes we are assisting NCSA in installing additional fibre optic cables to increase bandwidth, add resilience and help enable the Deployable Joint Staff Element concept. Additionally, we are improving security arrangements, particularly for visiting teams wishing to link into their own national networks. At Jåttå, we are providing additional accommodation for the newly arrived NCSA staff. We are also assisting the host nation with the new building project and one of the less noticeable improvements has been the removal of the oil heating for E-Block and its replacement with gas. This will be more environmentally friendly and will hopefully result in lower utility charges.



CDR Duncan with the JWC's Maintenance team



20 sheep, hit by one car?

By Lone Kjelgaard,
LEGAD, JWC

"20 sheep hit by one car? Are you sure? And they did all die?"

*"Well... actually only 16 died. Two I could slaughter and two are okay."
"And the 16 sheep were all hit by the same one car?"*

"Yes, an ISAF car."

*"Did it drive in circles and come around and pick off the survivors?"
"No. It drove by in a straight line on the street."*

This could be a typical conversation with a claimant, coming to HQ ISAF to seek compensation for damage allegedly caused by ISAF personnel.

Every Wednesday afternoon, the HQ ISAF Legal Office conducts a claims session by the main gate. This is the opportunity for the local population to forward their claims for compensation to ISAF.

The ISAF Claims Office, located at HQ ISAF, is responsible for the investigation, adjudication and settlement of claims that arise out of damage or injury from ISAF personnel. This is true whether such injury or damage occurs between ISAF participants or involves ISAF personnel and local Afghan civilians, international organizations, or Non-Governmental Organizations.

Settling and paying claims can be viewed in many ways. Yet it is most fair to view it as a combination of "doing the right thing", force protection and a confidence-building measure. By settling and eventually paying claims we retain the support of the Afghan population. Because the settlement of claims increases both the confidence of the local population and the force protection of ISAF personnel, it is important to settle meritorious

claims in a speedy, transparent and accurate manner.

According to the Military Technical Agreement between Afghanistan and ISAF, ISAF is not legally liable for any damage to civilian or government property caused by any activities in pursuit of the ISAF mission.

However, Commander ISAF (COMISAF) has made a policy decision to compensate where ISAF is at fault. This may include deaths and injuries as well as vehicle and other property damage. ISAF may also settle the claim where the responsible Troop Contributing Nation cannot be identified.

Firstly, claims are a national responsibility, and nations are required to receive, adjudicate and settle claims following their own national procedures. The ISAF Claims Office happily assists, if a nation needs help. So what does the HQ ISAF Claims Office do?

The ISAF HQ Claims Officer is the overall point of contact for claims against ISAF in general, but particularly in the Kabul area. The Claims Office investigates all claims against HQ ISAF. If a given nation can be identified as the nation involved in the incident, the Claims Office will forward the claim to that nation. Before that is done, the ISAF Claims Office helps the claimant gather all the information required to make a decision on the claim. The ISAF Claims Office can also give advice to the nations, but the nations will be bound by their national law, rules and regulations alone.

There are, of course, certain types of claims that the HQ ISAF Claims Office does not process. These in-



The Claims Office is located at HQ ISAF.



“...paying for real damages is crucial in maintaining our presence among the Afghan people, and it indirectly furthers the development of rule of law.”



clude claims arising directly from combat, combat-related activities or operational necessity. What does that mean? In short, practical terms, it means that ISAF will not pay for the damage caused to a compound that was bombed when insurgents used it for planning an attack against ISAF. On the other hand, if a civilian local national by accident is hurt in such an attack, he or she can seek compensation. Claims arising from land use will not be processed. ISAF has a Land Consignment Agreement with Afghanistan, which says that Afghanistan shall give ISAF the land and premises that ISAF needs for its mission free of charge, and that land claims will be handled by the Afghan Ministry of Defence.

Lastly, claims presented more than six months after the claimant has, or could have, reasonably discovered the damage, will not be processed unless the claimant has a valid reason for not filing his claim earlier. By settling and paying claims HQ ISAF is reaching out to the local population.

The types of claims are numerous. Some, like the above example are

not all that trustworthy. Others are fully documented – the Afghan way, which is not to say they would satisfy insurers back in your home country. It works here though.

A lot of the payments are made *ex gratia*, which means that ISAF will pay compensation without acknowledging legal responsibility for having caused the incident. The decision will be based on a plausible reconstruction of what happened. Things like the time of the day, the location of the incident, the driving patterns of ISAF, an eventual IMP report, knowledge of ISAF troops in the area and the threat level will all be taken into consideration before a decision is made.

The typical types of claims are road traffic accidents where cars, livestock, pushcarts or other property take damage.

The more adventurous claims are land claims, tent fires, gun shots and claims where allegedly lots of animals are killed by one car. On a number of occasions, ISAF troops unfortunately have to shoot warning shots to make a car or motorcycle stop if coming too close. We consider those claims as well. Why is that? Well, the driver did not act as he should have acted. However, if he turns out to be a regular person who just failed to pay attention to the traffic, ISAF can help him financially so that he can have his vehicle fixed. ISAF also provided medical assistance to a police officer, who got hit by glass and needed to have shards of glass removed from his face and neck. This sort of settlement is called *in kind*, rather than *in cash* like most.

Nevertheless, the ISAF Claims Office needs your help and therefore has a plea to all ISAF members, not just the ones at HQ ISAF. **If you have been in an accident, however small, please report it to the IMP or the Legal Office.** This is valid also if you suspect for instance that you might have touched a pushcart on the side of the road, while driving after dark – please report it.

Your report will be a tremendous help in determining the correct amount of compensation to award. Further, it will help a claimant actually prove that an incident did indeed occur. We need your help to adjudicate the claims and reach a fair decision. Unless you have behaved in an absolutely reckless manner, reporting incidents will be of no consequence to you. Claims between nations inside ISAF are waived. That is, the costs for repair are being paid by ISAF, and no blame is directed towards the driver.

“Sir, let me go over this one more time. You own a shop, where you sell dried fruits, dry goods of various kinds?”

“Yes I do.”

“And an ISAF vehicle drove into your shop and destroyed everything inside?”

“Yes.”

“These are the pictures showing your shop?”

“Yes.”

“Sir, with all due respect, this is a sea container that has been blown up from the inside; no vehicle could ever have done that.”

“Well, maybe the vehicle drove inside my shop and blew up.”

“Maybe it didn’t. Good day!”

This sort of discussion is just a cost of business in the conduct of modern operations; but as noted above, paying for real damages is crucial in maintaining our presence among the Afghan people, and indirectly furthers the development of rule of law. †

Further Reading



“EBAO and NATO Operational Claims”

by Col. J. Prescott, USA A,
The Three Swords magazine,
Issue Number 10, p. 5-9.

http://www.jwc.nato.int/files/10_07_Magazine.pdf



2008 candidates and the Selection Board. Photo by JFTC PAO.



By WO Christoph de Coster, BEL A, JWC Senior Enlisted Advisor

ACT Military Member of the Year 2008


SERGEANT Lars Lenvik, Royal Norwegian Air Force, represented the Joint Warfare Centre at the ACT MMOY 2008 Selection, which was held at the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), Bydgoszcz, Poland from 23 to 27 February 2009. ACT's MMOY Programme was established in 2003 with the first competition taking place in February 2004. The aim of this programme is to recognize the achievements of enlisted soldiers from ACT and its subordinate headquarters. MMOY candidates are all outstanding enlisted representatives of ACT, their Nations and NATO.

This was the first time that JFTC hosted such a special event. Before the competition started the next day, the JFTC Senior Enlisted Advisor welcomed us at the hotel and guided us to an ice breaker session, which has always been known as a great team-building event. The JFTC Protocol offered a well-de-

signed event, bringing people together in an excellent atmosphere where they mingled and got to know each other better. The next day competitions started at JFTC, where each candidate gave two presentations, one on his headquarters and the other, which was more of a challenge, a brief message on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of NATO. The day was both inspiring and instructive and provided something interesting for the candidates, as well as the MMOY Board Members. Late in the afternoon, a Norwegian officer took the candidates on a guided tour of the new JFTC facility. On Wednesday, they had a glimpse

of Polish history on a visit to Malbork, one of Europe's largest Gothic fortresses built by Teutonic knights in 1274.

The final part of the competition took place on Thursday, which was the last chance to impress the board. The first round of questions from the examiners addressed the candidates' general knowledge of NATO. All of them performed very well, making it very difficult for the board to select a winner. Only one could win, though, so the board members had to re-evaluate, argue, and lobby for the candidate each of them wanted to come through. Friday was the big judgement day for all nominees, with Maj. Gen. Rokos, former Director JFTC, announcing the decision of the Selection Board. Representing HQ SACT, Yeoman First Class Timothy Gowins earned the honours as the ACT Military Member of the Year 2008. All candidates provided superb presentations and showed that they truly have a vast knowledge of NATO.



“This nomination is one of the highlights of my military career.”

Sergeant Lars Lenvik, Royal Norwegian Air Force, said he was honoured to represent the Joint Warfare Centre and being selected as JWC’s Military Member of the Year, especially since 2008 has been declared as the Year of the NCO within NATO. This is a significant achievement and reflects great credit on Sergeant Lenvik’s performance last year. “This nomination is one of the highlights of my military career. As you know Norway doesn’t have NCO Corps. I started as a conscript in 2004 at Porsanger Garrison in Finnmark. I was also a member of the Home Guard Youth Organization in Trondheim. Now, I am posted at NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre and working together with some of the hardest-working and most dedicated soldiers, sailors and airmen,” he said. In the picture, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander JWC, congratulates JWC Military Member of the Year, Royal Norwegian Air Force Sergeant Lenvik. Lenvik is assigned to the JWC Graphics Section.



In early 2008, the NATO Strategic Commanders for Transformation and Operations signed a letter presented to the Alliance’s Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer; former Chairman of the Military Committee, Canadian Forces General Ray Hentault; and all Chiefs of Defence, which announced the “NATO Year of the NCO” campaign to highlight the significant contributions that Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) make to their service, their Nation, and NATO. The year was dedicated to recognising the vital role NCOs play within the Alliance. For further information visit www.nato.int/shape or www.act.nato.int.

► FEEDBACK FOR THE THREE SWORDS, JULY 08 ISSUE:

“I am Chief Petty Officer Scheuner, German Navy, currently serving in NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre at the Travel Office. We are supporting JWC’s missions by organizing all travel arrangements (TDY) for JWC personnel. Our work is very much like the work in every travel agency. Some very special challenges we face are the public transport of highly technical equipment and weapons, including ammunition.

In the German Armed Forces there are two different ways for an NCO career. On a very early stage of your career, you either decide to become a specialist very much focused on the professional skills in your area of expertise but still with leadership responsibility, or you are focused on leadership skills being a trainer, Drill Sergeant group/platoon leader. I have chosen to be a specialist in administration and worked in the human resources office, international exchange program, and as an admin NCO at a naval logistics school.

To gain experience in an international environment as part of my personal development, I applied for an international position. Therefore, I really appreciate the opportunity to serve in JWC as a highlight in my career. Looking back on 11 years of service, I can say, I am very lucky and proud to be in the NCO Corps, and thus an important part of the Armed Forces.”



Czech Republic Army Command Sergeant Major Ludek Kolesa, Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Allied Command Transformation



U.S. Army Command Sergeant Major Michael Bartelle, Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Allied Command Operations



By Inci Kucukaksoy, PAO JWC

WARRANT Officer Christoph de Coster, Belgium Army, was appointed as the Senior Enlisted Advisor (SEA), Joint Warfare Centre on 21 July 2008. His assignment to this position requires him to oversee the professional development and welfare of all enlisted soldiers posted to JWC. In addition to his current duties at the Real Life Support section, he serves as a kind of spokesman for the JWC NCO community, bringing their needs forward to JWC's top leadership. An extra touch was added to his SEA function when NATO declared 2008 "The Year of the Non-Commissioned Officer". The aim was to recognize the NCOs for their contribution to all areas of military activity and the role they play in transforming the Alliance.

WO de Coster entered the Belgium Army in 1987. During his 22-year career he has served as a transporta-

tion specialist and adjunct officer at Manpower and Personnel; Intelligence and Operations and Training. He deployed to Bosnia in 1993 and to Kosovo in 2000.

How do you feel about being JWC's Senior Enlisted Advisor?

This is a great honour. I thank both the Commander and the Chief of Staff for their full support and trust. I am more than happy to represent my fellow JWC NCOs and for the opportunity to work with them in a joint service and multinational environment.

Do you have any short term plans you would like to announce?

My first goal is to bring all NCOs together and offer opportunities for strengthening our relationship as a team. The aim is to share good ideas and learn from each other. I want to facilitate the JWC Enlisted Advisory Board into something that works. Here, we fo-

cus on the true needs and expectations of the NCOs. I see this as an excellent opportunity to promote a variety of initiatives and empower NCOs to move with the times to grow professionally. So, I hope this will be a great payoff for them. Resolving issues jointly by bringing all together is also crucial to develop the NCO Programme of Work for 2009. Once the foundation is laid, work can be done on the future development of our NCO corps. I will do what I can do to make it all work. It is not an easy task, though, so I do hope my fellow JWC NCOs will help carry the load of Senior Enlisted Advisor.

What are your exact duties?

I am the representative of all NCOs at JWC. I act as the liaison between the top leadership and the NCO community. As I said before, I chair the JWC Enlisted Advisory Board and represent NCOs at the Jättå Community Council meetings. I am also a non-voting member of the

Interview: WO Christoph de Coster, JWC Senior Enlisted Advisor



JWC Three Swords Club. I am not saying this is all. There is a lot more for a Senior Enlisted Advisor to do.

At this time, it is understood that your SEA position at JWC is not a full-time authorized position. Please tell us about your primary job at JWC, and how you will fit your SEA duties into your schedule?

My duties at the Real Life Support (RLS) and my SEA duties are very different, indeed, in the sense that they require different management skills. However, I have the full support of my colleagues in my section. With their and my family's support, I will be able to devote extra hours to both assignments. I can assure you that JWC NCOs are well represented and also that JWC recognizes and takes advantage of the many skills and areas of expertise our NCOs possess, because their contribution directly impacts JWC's success. I take great pride in their achievements.

What makes the work of the non-commissioned officers vital?

Leadership and professionalism. Every NCO is a specialist in his/her field. Most NCOs build on a lifetime of experience in their different areas of expertise. The NCO is the person who makes the difference, who makes things work. He is the force multiplier. He is the nail that holds the frame to the wall. This is due to hard work, professionalism and commitment to excellence. I believe that differences in nationality, language or culture do not matter. The common denominator of NCOs worldwide is mission accomplishment. All over the world, you will notice that NCOs serve in the double capacity of advisors to their superiors and father figures for their fellow soldiers.

What message would you like to convey to NCOs posted at JWC?

We do have a great future as NATO's top leadership recognizes the importance of the NCOs and their roles. We

have a leadership who cares. There are different views of the roles and responsibilities of the NCOs across NATO's 28 member nations. However, in general, nations do invest in the development of their NCO corps. NATO's two strategic commands, ACO and ACT, offer a variety of training and development opportunities for Senior NCOs and encourage the promotion of new ideas through conferences and joint workshops. Here at the JWC, there are a lot of things that I would like to improve. But this will not be all my work. It will be the work of the NCOs that come after me. My hope is to be able to plant seeds for the future. And my recommendation to my fellow NCOs is this: Do not hold yourselves back when the opportunity comes knocking! You are the reason why I accepted the SEA job. We all believe in the importance of a dedicated, professional and committed enlisted leadership. Continue doing your good work and stay focused. And remember: my door is always open! ✦

**Lt. General Korte, Commander JWC,
standing proudly in front of the new JWC building,
11 March 2009.**

Photographer: Pål Christensen
▶ Interview Page 41.

